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Abstract
Technological advances have created a new existence, providing an unforeseen level of
interaction and transaction between parties that have never physically met. Preliminary thinking
was that these advances would create a previously unimaginable level ofprivacy and anonymity.
While a surface examination suggests an abundance ofprivacy in modern society, a more
thorough examination reveals different results. Advances in technology and changes in public
policy have produced a world in which a startling amount of information is available regarding a
given individual. Rather than experiencing an increase in individual privacy, modern societies
suffer from rapidly decreasing individual privacy.
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Introduction
Cultural Influences
Before examining the current situation, it is insightful to examine the opinions ofpopular
culture. Fritz Lang's
"Metropolis"
(1927) was one of the first movies to explore the possibility of
humanity's dark future. Ayn Rand's
"Anthem"
(1946) focused on philosophical struggles in a
future where individuals did not choose their profession or spouse, and individuals identified
each other by a number rather than name. Although a vehicle for spreading objectivism,
"Anthem"
did suggest the notion that a unique number could mean more than an individual's
name, as the SSN (Social Security Number) often does in modern society. Next was George





presents a future where the government monitors individuals 24 hours a
day, and even their own thoughts are not private. The novel coined the phrase "Big Brother is
watching". "The
'Net"
(1995) introduced a world in which all of an individual's personal
information was available in digital form and stored in massive databases. The film highlighted
the fact that one mistaken entry could ruin an individual's life. In the movie, a criminal cracker
alters all of the warehoused information regarding the main character, causing law enforcement
to identify her as a criminal. "Minority
Report"
(2002), introduced a future in which police can
prevent crimes before they happen by predicting the future. In addition, the film presents a future
where biometric technology is ubiquitous. At one point, the main character is walking down a
street, and biometrics-enabled billboards scan his retina and change their advertising to suit his
preferences.
Definition ofPrivacy and PrivacyMeasurement
Although it may seem to possess a proper definition, the word
"privacy"
requires clarity.
The problem is that what privacy has been and what privacy is do not guarantee what privacy
will be or what privacy could be. For that reason, the best definition ofprivacy is "control".
When this thesis discusses an individual's right to privacy, it is referring to their right to have
control over their personal information. Privacy does not mean secrecy, as an individual may
freely share their personal information with everyone, if they so desire. Individual privacy
focuses on an individual's right to have control over their information, allowing the sharing of
their personal information only with their explicit permission.
Privacy is critical because it enables individuals to feel safe, secure and in control of their
lives. A feeling ofprivacy allows individuals to set limits that make them feel protected from the
outside world. In addition, privacy can influence an individual's behavior, particularly in their
shopping behaviors. Studies have found that an individual's shopping behavior can vary greatly
given their feelings of trust towards an organization and their desired level ofprivacy protection
(Glen Nowak, Joseph Phelps, and Giles D'Souza "Antecedents and"; SheenaMitchell "The
new").
Measuring privacy is difficult, as there is little prior knowledge on the subject ofprivacy
measurement. In addition, measuring privacy attempts to put quantitative values on qualitative
personal feelings, which each individual might perceive differently. This thesis measures privacy
as the "level ofprivacy as it should effect all individuals". This thesis defines a "Privacy Level
Indicator"
with a scale of 1 through 5, with 1 being the least invasive and 5 being the most
invasive. The defined levels are: 1-Controlled, 2-Acceptable, 3-Uncomfortable,
4-
Threatened, 5-UncontroIled. To add finer granularity, the scale contains quarter points. This
provides the ability to show a much more specific analysis of an event's effect on the "level of
privacy"
during the point in time when the event occurred.
One similar measurement of the level ofprivacy is that ofEPIC s (Electronic Privacy
Information Center) Privacy Threat Index. EPIC designed the index after September 11, 2001 to
mirror the
DHS'
(Department ofHomeland Security) Terrorism Threat Index. The Privacy
Threat Index contains 5 levels, each identified by a color and descriptive label. This thesis does
not utilize EPIC's Privacy Threat Index for two reasons. First, it was desirable to use quarter
points between each integer level, to provide a finer analysis of each threat. In addition, this
thesis looks to apply its designed scale to specific points in history, to determine the extent to
which privacy has changed over time, ending with a current level ofprivacy. Those two
objectives could not be met using EPIC's scale, although their scale is an important factor in
determining the level ofprivacy for recent events.
Most of the existing research has focused on the importance ofprivacy in specific
situations, the value ofprivacy, or methods ofbenchmarking the effectiveness ofprivacy
preservation methods. The AMA (American Medical Association) has created the Ethical Force
Program, to develop performance measures for ethics in healthcare. Novak, Phelps, and
Elizabeth Ferrell (2000) studied whether
consumers'
privacy concerns affected their willingness
to provide their personal information during transactions. Nowak, Phelps, and
D'
Souza (2001)
created an empirical study of how privacy concerns effect consumers. Christina Cary, Pruthikrai
Mahatanankoon, and H. JosephWen (2003) studied methods ofpreserving individual privacy
during the SDLC (Systems Development Lifecycle) and during data mining. Many researchers
have studied methods ofpreserving privacy in data mining. Numerous researchers have studied
1
For a comprehensive list, visit http://www.cs.umbc.edu/~kunliul/
research/privacy_review.html.
how privacy concerns affect the behavior of online consumers. Although many researchers have
studied the ways that privacy affects consumers and organizations, little research exists regarding
the effects of outside events on the availability ofprivacy. This thesis seeks to focus on that area
and address the following hypothesis:
HI: Changes in publicpolicy and technological advances have greatly reduced the level of
individualprivacy in modern society.
Panoptic Sort and Persistent Digital Nym
The goal ofproving that modern society is actually less anonymous and less private
requires the definition of a number of terms. The first term is the panoptic ("all seeing") sort. In
"The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy ofPersonal
Information"
Oscar Gandy provides the
following definition of a panoptic sort:
"The panoptic sort is the name I have assigned to the complex technology that involves the
collection, processing, and sharing of information about individuals and groups that is generated
through their daily lives as citizens, employees, and consumers and is used to coordinate and
control their access to the goods and services that define life in the modern capitalist economy.
The panoptic sort is a system of disciplinary surveillance that is widespread, but continues to
expand its
reach"
(qtd. in Alex Wexelblat 101).
As described, the design of a panoptic sort is to collect, store, and mine data describing all
possible aspects of an individual's existence, including personal, public, educational,
professional, political, legal, financial and recreational. In a panoptic sort, the entity performing
the sort operation retrieves information from any organization that possesses information
describing the individual in question. Organizations possessing information could include
libraries, credit card companies, credit bureaus, supermarkets, retail stores, IRS (Internal
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Revenue Service) records, DOT (Department ofTransportation) records, movie rental records,
criminal records, medical records and any other organization possessing records pertaining to the
individual in question. The potential uses for the information gained from a panoptic sort are
virtually unlimited, and depend on the needs of the organization performing the sort. Potential
investigating organizations include world governments, marketing agencies, credit card
companies and retail firms. In the US (United States), the government is the largest purchaser of
personal information.
This thesis presents a new term for "personal
information"
with a more concrete
definition: panoptic information. Panoptic information is defined as "All of the attributes that
describe an individual personally, physically, medically, educationally, politically, legally,
financially, mentally, emotionally, locationally and professionally". In more common language
terms, panoptic information is any piece of information that describes any attribute that relates
directly or indirectly to a given individual. This thesis seeks to examine the many ways that an
organization may gather pieces of an individual's panoptic information. Organizations can
perform minimal information gathering through the panoptic sort, in which an entity wishing to
gather information regarding an individual does so by contacting all of the various other
organizations that possess the information. A more intensive information gathering process
involves an organization creating and maintaining its own database of an individual's panoptic
information, such as the one under development by the USG (United States Government). This
centralized data store allows an entity to obtain an individual's panoptic information without
having to contact other organizations to retrieve the information, especially when using the
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The modern panoptic sort, whether conducted by a corporate or government entity,
follows the three-step process identified byWexelblat: identification, classification, and
assessment (104). First, an organization desires to identify every individual residing within a
country's borders. Next, the organization classifies and categorizes residents identified in the
first step into groups. For example, a current procedure might classify individuals on the
likelihood that they are a terrorist. Finally, the organization would statistically assess each
individual against their group as a whole to determine variance and attempt to predict future
outcomes.
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Databases present a dangerous threat to privacy, regardless ofwhether the information is
contained in one centralized database, or culled from many databases spread globally. Security is
paramount when dealing with any piece ofprivate information, and many organizations move
quickly into data storage without taking the proper security precautions: A developermistake at
LocatePlus.com left a database containing millions of names, SSNs, phone records and other
documents open to the public (Robert Lemos "Slip-up"). BJ's Wholesale Club, Incorporated saw
its database system cracked and thousands of customer credit cards stolen; the perpetrator used
some of the stolen credit card numbers for fraudulent purposes (Bob Sullivan "BJ's Wholesale").
CD Universe had the credit card numbers of 350,000 of its customers posted on a rogue Web
Site after its database was hacked (TroyWolverton "AmEx, Discover").
The USG has made many mistakes while increasing its database usage and
simultaneously attempting to reassure the public regarding the safety and privacy of their
panoptic information. According to Sullivan,
"A government subcontractor posted the names, birthdays and daily whereabouts of
hundreds ofupstate New York children to the Internet, where the information remained publicly
available for weeks until MSNBC.com notified authorities. . .The computer data which also
listed the names, addresses and other details of low-income and foster families passed through
three layers of subcontractors on its journey to the Internet ("Government agency").
The USG exercises minimal control and oversight when handling panoptic information, yet it
expects this country's residents to feel confident in the USG's ability to manage its
citizens'
data.
According to Sullivan, "The information revealed was explicit. In addition to names, birthdays,
and other personal information, a memo field in the database chronicled each child's daily
routine. . ("Government agency"). Organizations desiring to possess personal information
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regarding a given individual must focus on data security, or risk exposing that individual's life
history to the global community. The threat from centralized databases and panoptic sorts
combined with the threat from human error and crackers requires an increase in the Privacy
Level Indicator of lA, to 1.25. Although the combination ofpanoptic sorts and vast data
warehouses creates an enormous potential for information misuse, we have not yet knowingly
experienced such a data retrieval and storage operation on a grand scale. An increase in the
Privacy Level Indicator greater than lA point cannot be justified, as no organization has
demonstrated the capability of executing a large-scale panoptic sort.
Two related terms requiring definition are "true
name"
and "persistent digital nym".
Vernor Vinge coined the term "true
name"
in his essay "True Names", written in 1981. True
name is the term given to an individual's legal name in the physical world. People use their true
name in signing checks, using their driver's license, in conversation and through other common
daily activities. The opposite of a true name is a persistent digital [pseudojnym, which is the
name that an individual uses in the electronic ("virtual") world (Timothy C. May 44). Although
some individuals may use their true name in the virtual world, most people create a persistent
digital nym. The persistence of the digital nym is crucial to the success of the panoptic sort or a
centralized database. In the digital world, individuals may pretend to be anyone or anything they
desire. Individuals often create a persona to represent themselves in the digital world, and use
that persona for everything they do, usually selecting the same username for every site
registration, instant messenger (IM) username, eMail address, newsgroup posting or other
communication. This behavior adds persistence to the digital nym, so that its path through the
virtual world is easily traceable and distinguishable. In addition, the persistent digital nym may
develop its own separate personality and existence from that of the true name it represents.
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According to May, ". . .behaviors can and will be attributed to nyms. Some nyms will establish
the reputation ofbeing straight in dealings, others will establish a less savory
reputation"
(66).
The persistent digital nym makes following a person through the virtual world easier, rendering
the virtual world anything but anonymous. This thesis will present a case study to support this
claim.
In some ways, the origination ofpersistent nyms and true names dates back to colonial
times, when many people were illiterate. An illiterate individual would "make their
mark"
to sign




scribble on the signature line. By
using the same mark on every document, a person was able to establish a persona and signature
for themselves, even though they could not read or spell their true name. In modern society,
persistent nyms have existed in urban landscapes for years. Graffiti artists often paint the same
symbol on every object they vandalize. This symbol, known as a
"tag"
(the process of spraying
graffiti on an object is called "tagging"), represents the person that painted the graffiti, and is a
signature that they were once in that location.
Liberty and Passport: Persistent Digital Nyms go Corporate
The corporate term for persistent digital nym is digital identity. Digital identities are a
growing trend in IT (Information
Technology).2
According to David Greenfield, "At the highest
level, a digital identity represents an individual's identity online. This identity consists of a
username and attributes of that individual, such as a password, or even personal information. .
(41).
The two platforms for persistent digital nyms are Microsoft's Passport and the Liberty
Alliance's Project Liberty (Greenfield 40). The purpose of the two competing persistent digital
2
This paper chooses to use the term persistent digital nym, because it emphasizes the sense of longevity and
permanence, which better suits this paper's intended purpose.
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nym platforms is to create a SSO (Single Sign-On) environment and personal information store
for individuals and organizations. The corporate world has been the first to adopt the idea of
persistent digital nyms as a cost saving effort (Greenfield 40). The benefit ofSSO to
organizations is that it simplifies the authentication process for end users that require access to
multiple domains and enables automatic sign-on to applications that are SSO aware.
The efforts put forth byMicrosoft and the Liberty Alliance give consumers and
employees good reason to adopt a persistent digital nym, and potentially associate it with
information from the physical world. When an individual signs up with Passport
(http://www.passport.com), theymust provide a large amount ofpersonal information, including
first and last name, country, state, zip code, time zone, gender, birth date and occupation.
Passport does present an individual with choices regarding how much of the information they
desire to share with other companies. Microsoft initially aimed Passport at the typical end-user
browsing and shopping on the Web, and the service is making inroads in that market. One of the
keys to the success of the Passport system is its adoption by "member
sites"
that support
Passport's features. For example, eBay now allows a user to sign on to the auction site using
theirMicrosoft Passport, rather than setting up a new account for use only with eBay. This
allows an individual to create one account (using Passport) and then use it on any site that
accepts Passport logins. This mirrors operations in the physical world: One does not have a
separate driver's license for every store at which theymight want to shop and write a check.
Instead, they have one driver's license that every store accepts as valid ID (Identification).
Gaining widespread adoption ofPassport might pose a problem, as the Passport system is a
Microsoft controlled system, with no other large industry partners standing behind it.
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Currently, Liberty is in the development stages, and appears to be more oriented towards
the corporate customer. As such, consumers cannot receive an ID from Liberty. Liberty has a
much more open policy, and the support ofmany influential technological companies. It appears
that Liberty is poised and ready to dominate the corporate market.
IfPassport or Liberty spur the adoption of persistent digital nyms in the corporate
environment, biometrics and the digitalization of one's physical characteristics may be added to
their persistent digital nym, and consequently, to data stores. Organizations are increasing their
adoption ofbiometric measures such as fingerprint or retina scanning for the identification and
authentication of a given individual. The increased use ofbiometrics means that an individual's
fingerprints or retinal scan would be stored with the organization's chosen identity provider. One
problem with biometrics is that coordinated attacks threaten all forms of digitized information.
According to Simson Garfmkel, ". . .fingerprints do not really identify a person: theymerely link
a particular finger to a record in a file. Change the file, and you change the
identification"
(44).
Garfinkel continues, "Once a biometric is stored inside a computer, all of the security provided
by the biometric identification is lost. A stored biometric could easily have been copied from
another computer, rather than being discreetly
measured"
(65). Security is paramount if digital
information stores are going to be successful, and security experts have crackedMicrosoft's
Passport system multiple
times3
(Greenfield 43). In the final months of2004, many organizations
withdrew support for the Passport service, and stopped using it for their identitymanagement
needs. The most notable was eBay, who discontinued their support for Passport-based
authentication.
3
For more on the weaknesses ofMicrosoft's Passport, see Marc Slemko's papers at
http://alive.znep.com/~marcs/passport.
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Although one of the effects of these technologies was to increase privacy by providing
individuals with a method ofpositively identifying themselves, persistent digital nyms had a
greater effect on reducing privacy. Persistent digital nyms greatly enable the aggregation of an
individual's panoptic information, because they provide a consistent name for organizations to
use in their queries. An organization that supports Passport or Liberty could use its list of
registered
members'
persistent digital nyms and passwords to retrieve their banking, travel, and
other panoptic information from other organizations that support Passport or Liberty. In addition,
these platforms require perfect security implementation, or risk opening their massive networks
and
individuals'
panoptic information to the cracker community. For these reasons, persistent
digital nyms increase the Privacy Level Indicator to 1.75. The VS-point increase in the Privacy
Level Indicator is twice the 'A-point increase attributed to panoptic sorts and data warehouses,
signaling that persistent digital nyms pose twice the treat to individual privacy. The case study
will fully justify the increase attributed to persistent digital nyms by demonstrating a sample of
the volume of information that persistent digital nyms can provide.
Computer Technology
The following section provides a sampling of design and implementation flaws that put
users'
privacy and security at risk. The threats are increasing daily at a rate that makes it nearly
impossible to monitor every issue and flaw. The issues examined in the following section
provide examples from all of the major areas relating to computing technology.
Protocol Flaws
Most of the networking protocols and tools in use today originated decades ago in the late
1960s, before the conception ofubiquitous computing. The rapid rate of technological
advancement in the last decade has lead to the discovery ofperformance and security problems
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in many of the protocols that comprise the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol) suite. These are critical flaws, as the protocols of the TCP/IP suite comprise the
fundamental operations of the Web and Internet.
One problematic tool is the WHOIS command. As its name suggests, WHOIS retrieves
information regarding a given individual's identity, specifically the identity of a domain's
registrant. When an individual or organization registers a domain name, they are required to
provide contact information for the individual charged with administering the registered domain.
The problem is that much of this information is unnecessary as contact information, and presents
a serious violation of the registrant's privacy.
Many shareware, freeware and commercial programs are available for executing a
WHOIS lookup on a domain name. One of the best programs available is VisualRoute, which
combines many essential networking tools into one package. According to Aaron D. Sanders:
"VisualRoute is a ping, whois, and tracert program that displays the results of its tests in a table
and on a world map. VisualRoute can trace the route to an IP address or domain name, and return
the IP address, node name (including registrant, administrative contact, address, phone number,
when the domain lease ends, and IP addresses of the domain's DNS servers), worldwide
geographic location (including latitude and longitude), time zone, elapsed response time in
milliseconds, and network provider (including IP address block, DNS server IP addresses,
mailing address, and telephone number). VisualRoute returns this information for every hop
along the way, only failing at the end, if the destination network is set to block the Internet




VisualRoute gathers most of the displayed information from aWHOIS lookup to the queried
domain name. The following figure shows the WHOIS information retrieved using VisualRoute
7.0g to analyze http://www.rit.edu:
DOMAIN: rit.edu (whois.networksolutions.com) Snap...
Registrant:
Rochester Institute of Technology






Reporting of abuse related problems and questions.
Rochester Institute of Technology







Setsork Engineering and Administration Staff
Rochester Institute of Technology









Domain record activated: 21-Apr-1988
Domain record last updated: 25-Oct-2002
As shown in the screen capture, the information returned by the WHOIS query can be extremely
personal. The risk is minimal for organizations that register domain names, since most of the
information is public contact information for the organization. For an individual that registers a
domain name, the information could be very personal, including their home address and
telephone number.
One piece of dangerous information for business registrants is the fully qualified domain
names and IP addresses for the DNS (Domain Name System) servers that serve the domain. A
WHOIS reply also contains information about the network housing the domain. The following
figure shows the network provider information for the query to http://www.rit.edu:
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NETWORK; NET-129-21-0-0-1 [65536| (whots-arinjiet) Snap
OrgHame : Rochester Institute of Technology
OrgID: RTT-3









































f ARIN UHOIS database, last updated 2003-08-07 19:15
f Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIK's HHOIS database
OrgName: Rochester Institute of Technology
OrgID: RTT-3




Again, most of the information contained in this response is not that damaging to the
organization. One exception is the information contained in the second section, specifically the
NetRange and CIDR (Classless Inter-Domain Routing) lines. The NetRange value specifies the
block of IP addresses allocated to RIT (Rochester Institute ofTechnology). This gives an
attacker a sense of the size of the network (and often the organization) in question, as well as
listing the specific numerical range assigned to that organization. Providing the network range
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and server address information in the WHOIS database provides crackers, spammers and other
undesirables with information to enhance their attacks.
The questions regarding the information contained in the WHOIS database has caused
ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to consider a policy redefining
the information required during the domain registration process. One of the driving forces behind
the WHOIS consideration is EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Center
-
http://www.epic.org/privacy/whois/). Unfortunately, ICANN has never had the best interests of
the Internet or users in mind, and developing an official policy onWHOIS has dragged on for
over four years. In the meantime, some registrants have decided to resolve matters on their own.
NameSecure, a domain registrant since 1995, allows its customers to sign up for a service that
will mask their personal data in the WHOIS database. When an individual performs aWHOIS
query for a domain that uses NameSecure's WHOIS privacy service, the contact information
returned will be for NameSecure, not the organization responsible for the domain. NameSecure
will then forward any legitimate correspondence to the appropriate recipient.
Another problem related to the TCP protocol suite is that of eMail delivery, especially in
the case of the P0P3 (Post Office Protocol version 3) and IMAPv4 (Internet Message Access
Protocol version 4) protocols. These protocols handle user authentication and storage of eMail
messages on the server. The problem with these two protocols is that by default they do not
encrypt the connection between the client and the server. For this reason, eMail usernames,
passwords and message content are available to anyone using a packet sniffer. The following
figure demonstrates this problem using Network
Associates'
Sniffer Basic 4.50.05 to capture
packets from a computer running Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 and OE (Outlook Express) 6.
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For a POP3 account, Sniffer 4.50.05 caught packets that contained both the username and the
password. The following figure shows a portion of the packet capture:
Summary
TCP. D-110 S-1373 SYH SEQ-906428934 LEH-0 IH-6E5 .J J
IP: D-[0. 0,0.0] S=[0 0.0.0] LEH-0 ID"0
IP'
D=[0 0 0 0] S=[0 0 0 0] LEM-0 ID=0
TCP: D-110 S-1373 &CK-2949B04476 WIN- 65S3S
IP. D[0. 0.0.0] S=[0.u .0.0] LEH-0 ID-0
IP D-[0. 0.0.0] S-[0.0.0.01 LEH-0 ID-0
POP3 : C PORT=110 OSER userlsp.com
IP D-[0. 0.0.0] S-[0. 0.0.0] LEN0 ID-0
IP: D[0. 0.0.0] S-[0. 0.0.0] LEN0 ID-0
POP3 C PORT-110 PASS mypasBword
IP D" [0.0. 0.0] S-[0 0 0 0] LEN-0 ID-0
IP D=[0. 0.0.0] S-[0, 0.0.0] LEH-0 ID-0
As clearly visible in this figure, the Summary section of the packet capture displays the full
username (with domain and extension appended) and the password. In the original packet
capture, the username and password were pink to match the other text on the line. The author
altered them to hide their actual values and to make them easier to identify. As seen in the figure,
the protocol was POP3 and the port was 110, the common POP3 protocol port. The results are
the same for IMAPv4 andWeb-based eMail services.
Employee monitoring is a fiercely debated topic, and it is important for individuals to
assume that their employer possesses the technological capabilities and legal right to read
employees'
eMail messages or monitor theirWeb access. According to Janice C. Sipior, Burke
T. Ward and Sebastian M. Rainone, "As electronic communications grow in importance, so too
has the need to address privacy issues in the management ofE-mail systems. Because the legal
system has not kept pace with the ethical issues accompanying the use ofE-mail and there is no
agreement on what constitutes a reasonable expectation ofprivacy, organizations must create
their own internal
policies"
(41). Many companies now require their employees to sign
documents describing in detail the organization's technology policies. Court cases have
repeatedly upheld the right of companies to monitor and read their
employees'
eMail (42-43).
Other cases have upheld the right of ISPs and other eMail providers to read transmitted messages
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as well (AP "Court: E-mail"). This thesis will discuss additional problems related to eMail in the
workplace in later sections.
Any HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) transmission not protected by a secure session
is susceptible to intrusion. One example of this is the login process to simple managed
networking devices, such as cable modem routers. Cable modem routers manufactured by 3Com
Corporation do not use a secure login by default and do not even offer the option of secure login.
The authentication process for these devices transmits the password as plain text as part of a
POST request. Crackers could use the login information to open ports in one of these routers,
which are typically deployed by individuals or by SOHO (Small Office / Home Office)
companies for their primary communications, and by enterprise organizations for their backup
communication links.
The Problems of IP Addresses
IP addresses provide an easy method of determining an individual's physical location and
identity. Many tools and Web sites are available that can trace an IP to the organization that is
the authority to that address block, and possibly even to that IP address's geographical location.
Law enforcement, government agencies and criminals could use or abuse geographical IP
address information.
Determining an individual's IP address (and subsequently physical location) involves
getting them to send you an eMail message or visit aWeb page that you created. A typical eMail
header includes the following information: Message arrival time (in UTC - Coordinated
Universal Time), sender's return eMail address, text encoding, MIME (Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions) type information, sending eMail application and message ID (in the format
idNumber@,sendinghost,tld). Also included is the subject, sender's name and eMail address, date
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and time sent, date and time received, information regarding whether the message was forwarded
from one mailbox to another (in the format ORCPT originalemailfajoriginalhost.tld), sender's IP
address, recipient's eMail address, recipient's IP address, and FQNs (Fully Qualified Names) for
all servers directly involved in the transmission.
VisualRoute 7.0g (mentioned in the section regardingWHOIS lookups) is an exceptional
program for geographically tracking IP addresses and determining information regarding the
owner of the IP address. VisualRoute can query the end node using either an IP address or a
domain name. The ability to resolve IP addresses to domain names (known as a "reverse DNS
query") is an important part ofdetermining the physical location of an IP address, as the
originating domain for an IP address may end in one of the two character country codes,
revealing the host's country of origin (Ankit Fadia "Getting geographical"). VisualRoute 7.0g
also returns the time zone location of an IP address, providing more information regarding the
location of the IP
address.4
Web pages can gather
browsers'
IP address information using SSI (Server-Side Includes),
JavaScript, or through the HTTP and FTP (File Transfer Protocol) logs, which keep detailed
records of all requests for resources. These logs vary between server software packages, but
generally contain the type of request, resource requested, location of the requested resource, time
of the request and IP address that made the request.
Dynamic IP addressing is the method most commonly employed by ISPs (Internet
Service Providers) for regular customers, including dial-up, cable modem and DSL (Digital
Subscriber Line). The ISP assigns the dynamic IP address information (which may include IP
4
For in-depth case studies on using VisualRoute to determine the geographical location of an IP address, see
VisualWare's Web site at http://www.visualware.com. For a case study on using VisualRoute to determine the
identity and geographical location of a hacker, see Sanders, Aaron D., "Utilizing Simple Hacking Techniques to
Teach System Security and Hacker Identification".
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address, DNS server IP addresses, gateway IP address and lease time) to the user's computer
upon authentication to the ISP's network. The lease states the length of time a computer may
retain the address information before it must request a new address. During the renewal process,
the computer releases the address information and sends a renewal request to the server, in which
the computer requests new address information. One problem with dynamic IP addresses is that
they are often not dynamic. It is common for an ISP to assign a lease to a computer that is at least
one week in length. In addition, the servers assigning the IP address information keep a log of IP
address assignments that includes the date and time of the assignment, length of the lease, and
date of the
address'
release. For these reasons, dynamic IP addresses are usually as easy to trace
to the desired owner as static IP addresses. Numerous court cases have pitted ISPs against law
enforcement officials attempting to retrieve a copy of their IP address assignment list for
prosecution of a suspect. Many ISPs fight against orders to provide IP address assignment
information in the interest ofpreserving their
users'
privacy.
The problems with TCP/IP and the WHOIS command are extremely dangerous, and
increase the Privacy Level Indicator to 2.00. The only factor preventing a larger increase in the
Privacy Level Indicator is that many current computer users are not familiar withWHOIS
queries and IP address tracking. As pre-teen technology users move from elementary school to
high school, the threat from these factors will increase. Society requires a universal solution to
WHOIS privacy, because there is no reason for personal information in registration records.
Unfortunately, the other issues are difficult to remedy, and will remain unsolved. The problems
associated with the TCP/IP addressing scheme are inherent to the protocol's method of
operation, and are virtually impossible to
remedy.
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Cookies: A Dangerous Treat
Cookies are small text files (usually no more than a few kilobytes in size) used byWeb
sites to store information on the local computer. Web sites usually utilize cookies to customize
the site's layout to the user's preferences or greet the user by name. In the early days of
eCommerce, Web Sites used cookies to track details such as a user's credit card number,
username and password, and items added to their shopping cart, along with their layout
preferences. Due to privacy and security issues involving cookies, their use to store personal
information has declined, and session variables and database records have taken their place.
The majority of users select the same username and password combination for each site
that requires authentication. Obviously, it is much easier to remember one username and
password than it is to remember many varied combinations. Unfortunately, this enables an
attacker to take advantage of the user by designing aWeb Site that requires the user to provide a
username and password. Once the user enrolls with the site, their username and password will be
stored in the cookie on their computer or in a database on the server. Since the user probably
uses the same username and password for every site that requires authentication, the site operator
can attempt to use the user's username and password information on other sites, including
shopping, credit card and banking sites.
Cookies have a much darker side ofmischievous use. According to Michael Miller,
"Cookies are typically used to serve personal information to you on return site visits; they can
also be used byWeb-based marketers to track your online
behavior"
(385). According to Miller,
"Of late, however, a number of e-mail spammers have been using HTML e-mail to deliver
cookies to unsuspecting recipients
- and then using those cookies to track your online
activities"




cookies to come under examination. In modernWeb-based advertising, a few companies handle
the ad placement and display services for most of the ads served to users. These companies are
referred to as advertising networks because they specialize in marketing and advertising and they
place ads for companies on multipleWeb sites. Some of the largest advertising networks are
DoubleClick, WebSideStory (Hitbox) and Atlas DMT. Doubleclick's history contains numerous
accusations ofprivacy violations, in respect to the company's use of cookies and the personal
information they collected from the user.
An organization can contract with one of these advertising networks to streamline the
process of advertising on the Web. All of the mentioned advertising networks have developed
tools to help organizations with the ad creation process, and have performed an enormous
amount ofmarket research, enabling them to select the best resources for their clients. For
example, imagine that Toyota contracted with DoubleClick to place advertisements on the top
three news sites read daily by Caucasian women in the 20-29 age bracket. The privacy issue is
that ifToyota wishes to use the ads to place a cookie on the user's machine, the cookie's domain
of origin will be that of the advertising network (DoubleClick), and not the organization that
purchased the advertising service (Toyota). If two of the top three news sites were
http://www.msnbc.com and http://www.cnn.com, the cookies from Toyota's ads on those two
sites would belong to the domain DoubleClick.com, and originate from an address associated
with DoubleClick. For this reason, DoubleClick can track
users'
movements around the Web by
examining the cookies that they have placed on behalfof their partner organizations.
DoubleClick can read all of the cookies that it has placed on a given user's machine for any of its
partners (not just the ones for Toyota). The company can then offer to sell this information to its
partners as part of an advertising package. From cookies that it has placed on a user's computer
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ofbehalfof other companies, DoubleClick might determine that women of the previously
mentioned demographic regularly view pages from http://www.womansday.com, and suggest
that Toyota allow DoubleClick to place ads on that site.
Cookies can gather an unlimited amount ofpersonal information regarding an individual,
in addition to tracking a user's movements around the Web (hence the term "tracking cookie").
A user might have innocently signed up for a newsletter or filled out a form on a banner ad. Any
information they entered into the form now belongs to the advertising network, which usually
means that they will compile behavioral data and sell the information to all interested
organizations.
Verifying that cookies are indeed coming from one of the advertising networks is simple
(as is blocking them) when using IE6, which has built in cookie handling capabilities. Clicking
Tools>Internet Options, then the Privacy tab and finally the Advanced button will show the




You can choose how cookies are handled in the Internet




W (Override automatic cookie handtngi
First-party Cookies Third-party Cookies
(* Accept C AscepJ.
C Block P Bjock
C Prompt C Prompt
W Always alow session cookies
OK Cancel
Checking the box to override automatic cookie handling allows the user to fine-tune their
options for cookie handling. First-party cookies are the
"good"
cookies, placed on the user's
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computer by the site they are currently viewing. Most sites utilize first-party cookies for the
purpose ofpage customizations, such as local news, weather, and sports onMSNBC.com
(http://www.msnbc.com) or the ability ofAmazon.com (http://www.amazon.com) to identify the
user without requiring user authentication. Third-party cookies are the
"bad"
cookies, placed on
the user's computer by an advertising network. Blocking third-party cookies will rarely diminish
the user's browsing experience. Most sites utilize session cookies for the legitimate purpose of
maintaining the user's current session. Disabling session cookies makes shopping online very
difficult and many sites will not work properly without them.
Once a user has blocked the placement of third-party cookies on their computer, they can
easily verify that blocked cookies were from one of the advertising networks. When EE6 blocks a
cookie, an icon of an eye with a minus sign below it appears in the lower right-hand corner of the
browser window. Double-clicking on this icon will display information about the cookie that was
blocked. For example, visiting http://www.msnbc.com causes the blocked cookie icon to appear
in the specified area. Double-clicking on the icon brings up the following window:
Privacy Report
'.G_ Based on your privacy settings, some cookies were restricted or blocked.
Show: (RestrictedWeb sites
_^j
Web srtes with content on the current page:
Site Cookies
Wtp//view.atdrnt.aWMSN/rview/msmkhacOQ1 46... Blocked
To view a site's privacy summary, select an item in the list, and Summary
then click Summary. ~
Learn more about privacy.. Settings.. Close
As displayed in the figure, the blocked cookie originated from http://view.atdmt.com, yet none of
the ads displayed on the MSNBC.com front page are for any company residing at thatWeb
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address. The address http://view.atdmt.com is the domain used by the Atlas DMT advertising
network when placing cookies on a user's computer on behalfof one of their partners. Double-
clicking on a blocked cookie will bring up information regarding the cookie, the domain that
placed the cookie and possibly that organization's privacy policy. Clicking on the blocked cookie
in the figure confirms that Atlas DMT was indeed placing the cookie. The following figure
shows the cookies blocked while viewing a story onMSNBC.com:
Privacy Report
I fft Based on your privacy settings, some cookies were restricted or blocked.
Show: |RestrictedWeb sites "\





http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N2724.msnbc/B1 1 73255.10;sz*1 xl ;ord=37... Blocked
http://ad.doubleclick.netyadi/N2724.msnbc/Bn73255.9;sz=160xG00;or,.. Blocked
ii
To view a site's privacy summary, select an item in the list, and
then dick Summary.
Learn more about privacy... Settings.. lose
This figure shows three cookies that the domain http://ad.doubleclick.net attempted to place on
the user's computer. The served Web page does not have any ads for an organization named
DoubleClick, only uBid, Toyota, Newsweek and Compaq. The address http://ad.doubleclick.net
is the domain used by DoubleClick to place cookies on a user's computer on behalfof one of
their partners.
The EU, a leader in navigating the waters ofprivacy legislation, recently enacted laws to
prevent spam and limit cookie usage. "Last July, the EU adopted a tough privacy regulation on
electronic communications. It bans all commercial e-mail unless a recipient has asked for it. The
regulation also sets strict rules for installing Internet
'cookies,'




(eWeek "EU Orders"). Asian and North American governments should follow the
precedents set by the EU. Limiting the use of cookies is an important step in helping to protect
users'
privacy.
Spyware: Tracking your Steps
One of the most prevalent threats to anonymity on the Web is spyware. According to
Webopedia:
"Also called adware, spyware is any software that covertly gathers user information through the
user's Internet connection without his or her knowledge, usually for advertising purposes.
Spyware applications are typically bundled as a hidden component of freeware or shareware
programs that can be downloaded from the Internet. Once installed, the spyware monitors user
activity on the Internet and transmits that information in the background to someone else.
Spyware can also gather information about e-mail addresses and even passwords and credit card
numbers"
("spyware").
Some of the more prevalent spyware programs or companies include Gator, Comet
Cursor, ClickTillUWin and Alexa. Gator is probably the most prevalent spyware program in
existence today. According to Miller, "Its main function is to paste new pop-up ads over existing
banner ads - thus hijacking ad space for their clients. . .To give you an idea ofGator's reach, the
software sends an average of two pop-up ads per week to more than 15 million people
-
with
most users not even knowing that it's installed on their
systems"
(368). Since most spyware
programs are secretly bundled with other programs, users often do not know that the spyware
program is installed and running on their computer.
Some spyware programs work by installing a BHO (Browser Helper Object) into IE
(Internet Explorer). In some cases, the installation of a BHO causes the addition of a new toolbar
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to IE. In many cases, the BHO will not make any visible changes to the user's system or
applications, making it undetectable to the user. Once installed, the BHO can monitor the user's
browsing habits, pages viewed, time spent on each page and search engine queries. Some
spyware programs can even take control of a user's Webcam, turning it on without their
knowledge.
One of the more insidious operations of spyware is keystroke logging. Some spyware
programs install keystroke loggers on the infected machine, allowing the spyware 's creator to
record all of the user's keystrokes. Keystroke loggers provide the attacker with an ordered list of
every key the user types. Attackers could use the data to determine passwords, financial
information, credit card information and secret business or personal information.
Another operation of spyware is to enlist computers for spam mail campaigns. One recent
report states that hijacked computers send 30% of all spam (Munir Kotadia "Hijacked PCs").
Other estimates are not so cautious: According to Sullivan, "Researchers say hundreds of
thousands ofvulnerable computers are being used to launch spam campaigns now. In fact, 70
percent of all spam is now sent this way, according to anti-spam firmMessage Labs Inc. and
perhaps 6 to 7 billion spam messages are routed through hacked home
computers"
("The
secret"). Spammers often cannot transmit the massive number of eMail messages they send
(reportedly around 500,000 messages per hour for successful spammers) from an account with
one ISP without detection, so they use hijacked computers across the globe to spread the
workload.
The debate over spyware has reached Congress, as legislators are debating how to handle
the growing problem. The FTC (Federal
Trade Commission) believes that additional legislation
will only complicate the process of installing new software (MSNBC "Lawmakers vow").
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However, Congress believes that the FTC is not working hard enough to stop the spyware
epidemic, and spyware is too dangerous to address with a slow approach (MSNBC "Lawmakers
vow"). Only time will tell ifCongress can create a logical definition for spyware that will
separate legitimate software from illegitimate spyware, without greatly complicating the
software install process for end-users.
The threat from cookies and spyware is tremendous. These insidious threats lurk on the
individual's computer, and therefore have the potential to track and record everything that the
user does. Every key that the user types, every program they run and everyWeb site they visit
could fall into the criminal possession. For this reason, it is necessary to raise the Privacy Level
Indicator to 2.50. The threat from spyware cannot be understated, and is the most dangerous
threat examined thus far. While persistent digital nyms and the panoptic sort often require a
conscious effort by an individual to provide a piece of their panoptic information to at least one
organization, the secretive nature of spyware allows it to gather information with little action on
the part of the individual using the infected computer. Advances in spyware development are
moving at a faster pace than spyware detection software, and show no signs of slowing.
The Wonders ofWireless
All types ofwireless transmission are subject to capture and analysis, regardless of the
specifics of their operation. Capturing wireless signals can be very easy, depending on the
utilized signaling technology and the attention given to security in the implementation.
Although they provide a more flexible work atmosphere, wireless mice and keyboards
also offer a potential compromise to a user's privacy. These wireless devices use radio frequency
to communicate with the receiver. Although inexpensive, relatively simple and robust, radio
frequency technology is also much easier to intercept than
other wireless technologies, due to the
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relatively wide angle of the signal transmission. While manufacturers ofwireless keyboards and
mice develop them to limit the distance that the signal can
travel,5
the signals risk interception in
situations where close contact occurs, such as apartments, dormitories, computer labs and many
work environments. Like the radio in a car and other broadcast transmissions, receiving wireless
device transmissions does not require pointing the antenna directly at the source, as is required
with point-to-point transmissions. Instead, the receiving antenna only requires placement in the
air in an area that will receive the radio waves. In the case ofwireless devices, this means that
signal interception can occur within about ten feet in any direction from the device or the
receiver. One can test this by moving a mouse and keyboard away from the receiver in different
directions and different angles, testing the signal
loss.6
In addition, Logitech maintains aWeb
page that lists the radio frequency that every wireless Logitech device functions
on,7
making it
much easier to intercept the signals. Cordless telephones are vulnerable to the same problems as
wireless keyboards and mice, and it can be simple to intercept the transmissions between the
phone and the base antenna. It is important to remember that with a cordless telephone, the
telephone actually exists inside of the charging base connected to the wall by the phone cord. A
cordless handset is very similar to a radio antenna, designed to capture the radio signals
broadcast by the base. It is always interesting to walk around with a cordless handset, and
observe just how far the signal will travel, through both open space and through physical
obstruction. A typical 2.5 Gigaheztz (Ghz) cordless phone can cover the entire area of an average
5
Logitech's basic iTouch Wireless Freedom keyboard works flawlessly up to approximately 6 feet. From 6 to 8 feet
the keyboard functions, but experiences a slight delay before typed characters appear on the screen. The keyboard
stops functioning past 8 feet. The results are similar for the mouse that
accompanies the keyboard.
6
Along with the distances previously mentioned, the
Logitech iTouch Wireless Freedom keyboard and mouse used
to type this thesis have no problem transmitting data with the keyboard or mouse pointed in the total opposite
direction of the receiver.
7
The English language version can be found at
http://www.logitech.com/index.cfm?page=support/products/document&CRID=1796&contentid=4553&contentid2=
5 360&sho
walldocuments=0&countryid= 19&languageid= 1 .
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two story house. For these reasons, using a standard cordless telephone opens up the
user to
eavesdropping. Cellular telephones also suffer from many of the eavesdropping problems that
effect cordless phones.
Wireless networks suffer from the same security and privacy problems as wireless mice,
keyboards and cordless phones. Using a wireless network greatly decreases security and privacy,
and it is important to take proper precautions to secure wireless networks. Minimally, unsecured
wireless networks provide free Internet access to unwanted users through a practice known as
"War Driving". In War Driving, a cracker drives around a neighborhood looking for unsecured
wireless networks that they can use to gain free access to the Internet. By joining the wireless
network, they gain access to all of the resources available to authorized users. In the worst-case
scenario, unsecured wireless networks provide crackers with access to passwords, financial
information, credit card information, private files and other resources not meant for public
consumption. It is not uncommon for a home owner or apartment dweller to detect multiple
unsecured wireless networks within range of their equipment.
The solution to wireless problems is encryption. Encryption protects a signal so that only
the intended recipient can read the message. Only a few models ofwireless keyboard support
encryption from the keyboard to the receiver. Models supporting encryption are much more
expensive than models that do not, and encryption is disabled by default, nor is the user strongly
encouraged to enable the keyboard's encryption feature. Only the most expensive cordless phone
models support encryption, although the number ofphones that support encryption increases as
the cost of implementing encryption rapidly decreases. Most cellular phones support encryption,
although support for encryption in cellular networks is not widespread. Both components are
necessary for a properly encrypted cellular
system.
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In terms of the Privacy Threat Indicator, wireless does not have a clear and obvious
effect. The threats from wireless technologies raise the indicator to 3.00, because most
individuals are not aware of the proper techniques for securing wireless communications, and
many wireless security standards are still imperfect. At the same time, marketing campaigns
have pushed wireless technologies into many homes and businesses. The key point is for
wireless vendors to address the lack of awareness on the part of the consumer, and create
wireless devices and technologies that are highly secure from their first activation. As awareness
and technology improve, the threat from wireless communications should decrease. If these
changes do not occur, the threat from wireless devices will increase proportionally to their
market penetration.
Archiving
As technology advances and the cost per megabyte of disk storage decreases, archiving of
data becomes common. Three often-archived resources that can reveal an individual's panoptic
information are newsgroup postings, eMail messages and Web sites.
The functionality ofUsenet newsgroups is very interesting, as almost every message ever
posted to every newsgroup is contained in a public archive (now owned by Google, and accessed
through http://groups.google.com). TheWeb-based front end to the archive enables searching
through the postings based on a wide variety of search criteria, including post author. "The
Smoking
Gun"
used the Usenet archives to uncovered incriminating messages posted years ago
by current contestants on the CBS reality show
"Survivor"
("More Sleazy"). The case study later
in this paper will examine newsgroup archives further.
Organizations are increasingly archiving eMail, as proofof statements or actions. The
recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; H.R. 3763) legislation will
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increase most organization's eMail archiving practices. The law requires detailed audit trails of
publicly held
companies'
accounting, financial, and technological practices, including permanent
archiving of all eMail messages. An unscientific poll conducted by Sunbelt Software found that
30.68% of respondents (197 votes) do not archive eMail, 14.48% (93 votes) archive eMail 0-6
months, 9.65% (62 votes) archive eMail 6 months to 1 year, 20.71% (133 votes) archive eMail
1-
5 years and 24.45% (157 votes) archive eMail 5 years or longer ("Do You"). Other legislations
and the threat of legal action have caused many ISPs and businesses to consider implementing
eMail archiving.
Web sites have been archived since 1996 by The Internet Archive's "Wayback Machine".
With the WaybackMachine it is possible to view nearly every version and update of a site since
1996, even if the site no longer exists at the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) specified. The
Wayback Machine is very interesting from a historical perspective, allowing an individual to
examine the changes in style and layout that a particular site followed through the years. As with
newsgroup postings and archived eMail, the Wayback Machine also allows viewing ofpages and
statements from an individual's past that theymight have been trying to forget.
eMail archiving should not effect the privacy level anymore than the insecurity of the
original eMail transmission. In fact, SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) compliant organizations are required
to record every instance of an individual accessing the organization's eMail archives, providing
some sense of reassurance regarding eMail archiving. Worse are the archives ofWeb sites and
Usenet posting. At this point, neither is threatening enough to raise the Privacy Level Index
(since Usenet postings and Web sites are globally public in their original creation). However, we
are guaranteed to see examples in the future where politicians or other public figures are
embarrassed by archived messages from their past.
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Information Gathered from the Local Computer
The previous paragraphs detailed methods of gathering information about an individual
from locations that are remote to that individual and their property. It makes sense that since a
large amount of information exists on remote and indirect sources, an even larger amount of
information may exist on an individual's personal computer. Law enforcement agencies often
confiscate an individual's computer during a criminal investigation. Some obvious sources of
personal information (documents, pictures, eMail messages, receipts for online purchases) exist
on an individual's computer and are generally easy to remove. However, much subtle and
well-
hidden information exists on an individual's computer that can provide many details regarding
the individual. Although encryption programs (such as PGP) can protect visible information
sources, these other subtle clues may be difficult to erase.
On a computer running Windows 98 orME, the files Applog.log
(\%windir%\Applog\Applog.log) and Optlog.txt keep a record of every application executed on
that computer, the frequency of execution and the date and time of the application's last
execution. Although the intended use of the file is to allow the Disk Defragmenter to better
optimize the disk drive, the files could be very useful in logging information about an individual
and their activities. Frequent use of a Visual Studio application (especially Visual Basic) could
be evidence of an individual that practices writing viruses. Frequent use of a P2P (Peer-to-Peer)
file sharing application could be evidence of a media pirate. Frequent use ofphoto editing or
video applications could be evidence of a child pornographer. The files are created by the Task
Monitor application, which is installed on every Windows 98 computer and (without user
intervention) runs while the computer is power on, tracking application usage. Deleting the
Applog.log file is only a temporary solution, as the Task Monitor will create a new file if it
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cannot find an existing one. The only way to prevent the creation ofApplog.log is to disable the
Windows 98 orME TaskMonitor, which in turn reduces the effectiveness of the Disk
Defragmenter. In Windows 2000 and XP, information regarding application usage is available
through the "Add/Remove
Programs"
applet of the Control Panel. Windows XP contains a folder
named Prefetch, located at %systemdrive%\Windows\Prefetch. This folder contains a list of the
most often-used programs and drives, for use byWindows and Disk Defragmenter. As with the
Applog.log file in Windows 98 andME, information in the Prefetch folder could be used to
determine information regarding the user's habits.
Many companies install software packages on their
users'
computers and servers to
determine what programs the user executes on the computer, usage frequency and usage
duration. These monitoring programs have many legitimates uses, including license enforcement
and determining which programs are most popular and which are rarely or never used. This
information enables companies to make better judgments in their future purchasing decisions.
However, usage data also provides companies with the ability to profile the interests of their
employees, as well enabling them to create a detailed analysis of the amount of time an
employee spends working.
Starting withWindows ME and continuing to Windows XP, Microsoft has implemented
the ability roll the system back to an earlier date. Although previous versions ofWindows
allowed the user to roll the Registry back to an earlier date, the ability to roll most of the system
back to an earlier date and recover any lost data or settings is a major change. While the System
Recovery feature could enable a user to recover data in the event of a loss or accidental deletion,
it also enables the recovery of data that the user may have been trying to destroy.
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By default, each individual installation ofWindows Media Player 9 contains a unique
player ED that identifies each individual installation and user. Considering that by default Media
Player 9 contacts Microsoft and Atlas DMT every time it starts, the use of a unique ID is
unnerving. Thankfully, it is possible to configure the application to prevent it from contacting
Microsoft and Atlas DMT, and spyware removal programs can delete the unique ID from the
system registry.
In addition, Media Player maintains a media library, which keeps a very detailed list of
all media ever played by the player. The Media Library can be accessed through a button on the
left side of the player's navigation menu. The first category in theMedia Library is the Now
Playing list, which contains a list of the media currently playing. Every item on the Now Playing
list is also contained in its respective category in the library (music or video).
The All Music category contains three sub-categories: Artist, Album and Genre. The All
Music category contains the following information about every audio file played onMedia
Player 9: Title, artist (if embedded in the file), album (if embedded in the file), rating, Media
Info, Genre (if embedded in the file), Length, Bitrate, Type (.mp3, .wav, .wma), Acquisition
Time (last time the song was played), and the File Name. Songs played from the legal retail copy
have the designation
"(retail)"
beside their album name. All other copies have no indication
towards their status, but the absence of the
"(retail)"
designation conveys plenty of information
about their origin. This information is a treasure trove forMicrosoft, marketers and law
enforcement officials.
The Artist sub-category displays a list of all authors embedded in played audio files.
Double-clicking on an artist's name reveals all of that artist's songs played on the player (with all
of the information contained in the All Music listing).
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The Genre sub-category displays a list of all genres embedded in audio files.
Double-
clicking on a genre reveals all of the songs played on the player from that genre (with all of the
information contained in the All Music listing).
The All Video category is constructed similar to the All Music category, with sub
categories for Actor and Genre. The attributes recorded for each video file are the same as those
recorded for every audio file. The Actor sub-categories lists all video files which had an actor
embedded in them, and the Genre sub-category lists all videos that had a genre embedded in
them.
TheMy Playlists category lists all playlists played on the player.
The Radio category lists all radio stations streamed to the player.
Minimally, the information gathered from Windows Media Player 9's Media Library
provides plenty of information regarding the individual's listening and viewing habits and tastes.
It could also tell a lot about the legality of the media consumed by the user. If an individual is
concerned about information contained in the media library, right-clicking on a file and selecting
Delete From Library allows an individual to delete the listing from the library, as well as from
their computer (if they choose this option). The Options menu in the player can also clear this
information. On the Privacy tab, there are buttons to clear all of the media in theMedia Library.
The Options menu also contains checkboxes that allow the user to increase the privacy of
the player (contained on the Privacy tab). Included are the ability to prevent the player from
sending its unique ID to content providers, and the ability to prevent the player from sending
usage data to Microsoft.
In the case ofWindows Media Player 9, it appears that physical access to the local
computer might not be necessary in order to view a user's Media Library. On June 25, 2003
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Microsoft released "Microsoft Security BulletinMS03-021 : Flaw In Windows Media Player
May Allow Media Library Access (819639)", and then updated the release with new information
on July 4, 2003. According to theMicrosoft TechNet bulletin:
"An ActiveX control included with Windows Media Player 9 Series allows Web page authors to
create Web pages that can playmedia and provide a user interface bywhich the user can control
playback. When a user visits aWeb page with embeddedmedia, the ActiveX control provides a
user interface that allows the user to take such actions as pausing or rewinding the media. A flaw
exists in the way in which the ActiveX control provides access to information on the user's
computer. A vulnerability exists because an attacker could invoke the ActiveX control from
script code, which would allow the attacker to view and manipulate metadata contained in the
media library on the user's
computer"
("Microsoft Security").
A Web page that combines an embedded media clip with a correctly written ActiveX script
would allow an attacker to compromise theMedia Library on an unpatched system. The
vulnerability makes it much easier for law enforcement or a cracker to gather information
regarding the user. In addition, the attacker has the ability to manipulate the data in theMedia
Library, allowing them to add or delete entries to the Media Library, potentially framing the
individual for crimes not committed. The flaw may also allow an attacker to gain knowledge of
the current user. According to the TechNet bulletin, "The attacker might also be able to
determine the user name of the logged-on user by examining the directory paths to media
files"
("Microsoft Security").
It is only fair to note that Microsoft is not the only company to experience problems with
its media player. RealNetworks, creator of the once popular RealPlayer streaming media player,
has had many problems with its media player, ranging from privacy violations (sharing user data
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without consent) to allowing improper access to the local computer. One vulnerability enabled an
attacker to hijack the local machine and gain full access rights equal to the current user.
Media applications like Windows Media Player, RealNetworks RealPlayer and
MediaMatch Jukebox retrieve theirmedia information (and in applicable cases perform their
privacy violations) by contacting CDDB (http://www.gracenote.com/). CDDB (now known as
GraceNote) maintains a user updatable database ofnearly every professional audio recording
ever made. The company sells the information it gathers from media players to organizations
interested in utilizing the data for marketing purposes. For this reason, unique player IDs and
privacy violations are a serious matter. The information transmitted to CDDB varies by
application. For example, Easy CD Creator contacts CDDB's database to generate playlist
information for CDs before copying. During the query, Easy CD Creator provides CDDB with
its application name and version number. DisablingMedia Player's unique ID greatly reduces
the threat from a query to CDDB's database.
Microsoft's popularMessenger chat program is also open to attacks. According to
Michael Kanellos, "The vulnerability inMSN Messenger versions 6.0 and 6.1 could let an
attacker view the contents of a victim's hard drive during a chat session with the
victim"
("MSN
Messenger"). The attacker can retrieve and view files on the victim's hard drive without their
consent. If the attacker finds files containing the victim's passwords or financial information,
then identity theft is almost certain to follow.
Microsoft Word contains a feature called Track Changes that allows an individual to send
a document to multiple recipients for editing. The individual monitoring the document's progress
can then implement suggested changes into a master copy of the document with ease. The
problem is that many features ofWord, including the Track Changes feature, store metadata
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regarding the document. Users can edit some of a document's metadata properties by clicking
File > Properties. Available metadata for aWord document includes title, subject, author (by
default the registration name for the Word installation that the document was created on),
keywords, comments, date created, date modified, last date accessed, user that last saved the
document (by default the registration name for the Word installation that the document was
created on), revision number and total editing time.
When utilizing the Track Changes feature to manage a document's progress, the metadata
includes information regarding previous versions of the document. The SCO Group,
Incorporated discovered the effects of this feature when changes were uncovered in some of their
legal documents. According to Stephen Shankland and Scott Ard, "The SCO Group filed
lawsuits this week against DaimlerChrysler and AutoZone, but the Unix seller's attorneys also
had prepared a complaint against Bank ofAmerica, according to a document. AMicrosoftWord
document of SCO's suit against DaimlerChrysler, seen by CNET News.com, originally identified
Bank ofAmerica as the defendant instead of the
automaker"
("Hidden Text"). SCO's legal team
did not realize that the metadata created by the Track Changes feature existed, and it provided a
glimpse into the company's thought process in determining the targets of its lawsuits. According
to Shankland and Ard, "In the case of SCO's lawsuit against DaimlerChrysler, the Word
document identified Bank ofAmerica as a defendant until Feb. 18-at 11:10 a.m., to be exact.
The location for filing the suit also was switched from Bank ofAmerica's principal operations in
California to Michigan, DaimlerChrysler's home state, on Feb.
27"
("Hidden Text"). In
addition, flaws affecting the local user may originate from a server the user is connecting to,
rather than on the user's computer. A flaw inMicrosoft's Exchange 2003 eMail server software
allows improper file access. According to Matthew Broersma, "The bug appears to affect an
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Exchange component called Outlook Web Access (OWA), which allows users to access their in-
boxes and folders via aWeb browser. Consumers logging into theirWeb-based mailbox
sometimes find themselves accessing another user's account, with full privileges. . ("Exchange
flaw"). Allowing a flaw that is as fundamentally erroneous as this one is a major embarrassment
forMicrosoft. Rather than requiring the intruder to explore the system to find its weakness, this
Exchange 2003 flaw directs the user to other folders on its own.
Most computer users do not realize that deleting files from their hard drive does not
permanently destroy them. Computers organize their hard drives like a book, with a table of
contents pointing to the corresponding content. Deleting a file does not remove that file from the
drive. Instead, the OS removes the file's entry from the table of contents, know as the FAT (File
Allocation Table) or the MFT (Master File Table). Computers, being rather unintelligent devices,
normally do not know how to retrieve data once they remove the corresponding entry from the
FAT. However, freeware and commercial programs are available that can recover or
"undelete"
previously deleted files. A computer only permanently deletes files when they write a new file in
the same storage location that contains the old file. Even then, professional data recovery
companies possess special equipment that can usually recover the original file.
Drive erasers are software applications that solve the problem of data deletion. When a
drive eraser deletes a file (knows as "wiping"), the program writes a special sequence to the
selected area that will minimize data recovery. Most drive erasers operate in conformity with a
specification on proper data destruction put forth by the DoD. This specification details how to
destroy sensitive data without harming the drive. For data of extreme sensitivity, the only way to
guarantee data destruction is to use a drive eraser to wipe the drive, then physically destroy the
drive's platters with a hammer, drill or through incineration.
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One recent study found that drive sanitization practices are varied, but lean towards being
careless rather than cautious (Abhi Shelat and Simson L. Garfinkel). In their study, Shelat and
Garfinkel purchased hard drives from the secondary market (mostly from eBay) and examined
the
drives'
contents for readable data. According to Shelat and Garfinkel, "Of the 129 drives that
we successfully imaged, only 12 (9 percent) had been properly sanitized by having their sectors
completely overwritten with zero-filled blocks; 83 drives (64 percent) containedmountable
FAT16 or FAT32 file systems. (All the drives we collected had either FAT16 or FAT32 file
systems.) Another 46 drives did not have mountable file
systems"
(24-25). They discovered one
drive used in an ATM machine that still included 2,868 account numbers, dates of access and
account balances (25). Approximately 42 of the examined drives contained recoverable credit
card numbers (25). Their study emphasizes the critical importance ofproperly sanitizing drives
before their disposal, reuse or resale.
The following scenario reinforces the importance ofproperly wiping disk drives before
disposal. A company in Rochester, NY (New York) disposes ofused computer equipment,
donated by individuals and organizations in the area. The organization once received a server
marked for disposal by a local school district. The school district did not wipe the hard drives
before disposing of it. Being interested in information security, the organization's employees
decided to attempt to view the data on the server's disk drives. The server had a RAID 5
(Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks) disk array, so it would have been extremely difficult to
read the disks by simply placing the drives in another computer. Since the server was running
Windows 2000, the employees reset the Administrator password using Passware's Password
RecoveryKit 6. Once logged in, the employees attempted to recover any recently deleted data
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using Norton Utilities. The server had been the district's student eMail server, and Norton
Utilities recovered all of the archived messages. The employees then properly wiped the drives.
For confidential drives, the minimal procedure is to format the drive, wipe the drive, then
physically destroy the drives platters by drilling holes through them or breaking them with a
hammer. Individuals concerned with sanitizing drives from their home computers should format
the drives, then erase them to DoD standards. The most popular drive eraser program is Eraser
5.7, available from http://www.heidi.ie/eraser/default.php.
The threats posed by the Windows OS and various Windows applications are numerous,
and a number of groups have suggested a migration to other OSes. However, most Windows
flaws are preventable through regular use of the Windows Update site. As a result, software
flaws raise the Privacy Level Indicator to 3.25. While it is necessary to increase the Privacy
Level Indicator, it is difficult to justify an increase greater than !/4-point. Users are migrating to
newer OSes at a higher than anticipated rates, and newer OSes automate many of the tasks that
are necessary for system security. Awareness of security issues is improving, and many new
vendors have entered the security market. An increase in the Privacy Level Indicator greater than
'/t-point would place OS flaws on equal footing with persistent digital nyms and wireless
technologies, which they are not.
Available Information Section
The Wallet as a Tracking Device
One of the easiest ways to gather information regarding an individual is through the
acquisition and subsequent usage of items contained in their wallet. Most individuals do not
realize how often they are directly providing information to other sources.
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The most common and most damaging item in the wallet is credit cards, including
gasoline and store cards. During the initial application for a credit card, an individual provides
information to the potential creditor. Although this personal information describes the individual
applying for credit, the credit card company considers themselves the owners of the information
provided in that specific transaction, because it involves them receiving payment (personal
information) in return for the provision of a service (a credit card, pending the individual's
approval).
When a credit card company approves an individual for credit, they enter all of the
individual's personal information into a database maintained by the credit provider. Credit
providers believe that the information is theirs to use as they please, in accordance (or
occasionally in violation of) their privacy policy. In almost all cases, this means that a credit
provider will sell all of the information it possesses regarding each customer to as many of its
partners as possible. Modern technology enables an effortless transfer of information, as a
creditor simply needs to transfer all of their customer records to CD (Compact Disc) or provide
access through an electronic interface. The sale of data causes the telephone calls, eMail
messages and postal mail letters from telemarketers, offering an unimaginable array of goods and
services.
The problems with credit cards do not stop with the sale ofpersonal information, as credit
cards can leave an audit trail describing an individual's lifestyle. Details might include their store
preference (brick and mortar or online), travel habits (where, when, how long and the route
traveled), spending habits, hobbies and interests, and their needs, wants and desires. Credit card
purchases show the amount of the purchase, items purchased, and the date and time of the
purchase. Individuals should be concerned about the information generated by credit card
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transactions and maintained by the credit provider. The volumes of information that credit
providers possess regarding an individual paints an amazing picture of the individual's personal
characteristics, and provides plenty ofuseful information to companies willing to pay the credit
provider's fee. It should not be surprising that organizations conduct credit checks before
granting credit to an individual, for job applications and for rental applications.
Another interesting card is the one provided by Jillian's, a national chain of "adult fun
centers". An individual can partake in the following activities at a typical Jillian's location:
Bowling, billiards, numerous video games, darts, air hockey, foosball, eating and drinking. To
play a game at Jillian's, one must acquire a Jillian's card and place money in the account that is
associated with the card. Every game in Jillian's has a card reader, which automatically deducts
the cost of that particular game from the player's account. When the player's account no longer




The problem with the Jillian's card is that every card reader is a networked device, which
stores account information in a database. Information recorded includes games played, time, date
and location. In this way, an individual's playing habits, frequency and types of games played
could be determined by gaining possession of their card, or breaking into Jillian's information
database. There is no doubt that the government, employers, or insurance companies would love
to know if a suspected terrorist, murderer, or employee regularly played games that involve
shooting and violence. Plenty of anti-violent gaming organizations would also be interested in
the information available from Jillian's database.
One of the more prevalent methods of gathering panoptic information about an individual
is through "dumpster diving", in which one individual searches through another individual's
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waste in search of tidbits of information. Dumpster diving ranges from common theft from an
individual's garbage can to large-scale corporate espionage. Larry Ellison, CEO ofOracle, once
hired someone to search through dumpsters belonging to rivalMicrosoft in search of secret
information regardingMicrosoft's oft-criticized business practices. Thieves often pose as
homeless people searching through dumpsters looking for food, when they are really searching
for discarded financial information to use for fraud purposes (Garfinkel 30). This is a threat
regardless ofwhether you actually place your refuse in a dumpster, as garbage cans are equally
vulnerable to invasion. Preventing dumpster diving simply requires destroying any information
that might be of use to anyone else, minimally by using a cross-cut paper
shredder.8
For these reasons, it is important to shred any documents relating to credit cards or
personal financial information. Statements vary between card issuers, but it is safe to assume
that all statements will contain the full credit card number, credit card type and mailing address
of the cardholder. Equally dangerous are the unsolicited credit card offers that most individuals
regularly receive in their mailboxes. These offers often come with all of an individual's personal
information pre-filled, including their SSN. Throwing these offers away without shredding them
first is dangerous. When considering what documents to shred, always err on the side of safety
and privacy rather than being lax.
It is also very important to examine receipts for any goods paid for with a credit card, as
they sometimes contain the complete billing information. In addition, just because one store in a
chain displays certain pieces of credit card information on a receipt does not mean that all stores
in the chain will display the same information. Franchises generally give freedom to their
franchisees in the selection of their financial suppliers, as well as the specific settings of the
8
Incineration is probably the best way to dispose ofunwanted documents, although access to a place to burn is
difficult, especially considering laws regarding burning and pollution.
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credit card machine they select. In addition, when paying by credit card, it is important to
examine both copies of the receipt. In many cases, a store will place the entire credit card
number on the store copy, but place only the last four digits on the customer's copy. This is very
dangerous and impractical. All this does is gives store employees the opportunity to steal the
customer's credit card information from the receipt and use it later for their purchases. The
following table displays a small sample of stores in the Rochester, New York area and the
information they place on their credit card receipts:
Store Location Card Type Account
Number
Expiration Date
Subway Henrietta No Full Yes
Barnes & Noble
Booksellers
Pittsford Yes Last 4 digits No
Tops Markets Henrietta No Last 4 digits Yes
Big Lots Henrietta No Last 4 digits Yes
Office Depot Henrietta Yes Last 4 digits No
Target Henrietta Yes Last 4 digits No
Old Navy Henrietta Yes Last 4 digits No
Atlanta Bread
Company
Henrietta Yes Full Yes
Subway Henrietta Yes Last 4 digits No
Subway Henrietta Yes Last 4 digits No
Wegmans Henrietta No Last 4 digits Yes
Tully's Good
Times
Henrietta Yes Full Yes
U.S. Postal
Service
Henrietta Yes Full Yes
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Ruby Tuesday Henrietta Yes Full Yes
All receipts require shredding, even ones that contain only partial information. A thiefwill
probably retrieve multiple receipts from the garbage at one time. By comparing the information
contained on each, the odds are very good that they will be able to gather the complete
information for at least one card. However, not all retailers are guilty of endangering their
customers'
privacy. In one instance, the International House ofPancakes restaurant, located at
2190 North Goodman Street, Rochester, New York 14609-1043, temporarily provided customers
with the "restaurant
copy"
of the receipt, because it was printing with the customer's complete
credit card information, and the "customer
copy"
was not.
The Dangers ofPublic Records
Public records have long been dangerous due to their availability, but before the Web,
their danger was limited, because retrieving a public record often meant traveling to the physical
archive where the record was stored. With news and gossip organizations battling each other to
see which one can ruin more people's lives, information gathered from a public source becomes
digitalized and made globally available in minutes. The Smoking Gun
(http://www.thesmokinggun.com), a popular news site on the Web, has used public records and
the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act; 5 U.S.C. 552, As Amended By Public Law No. 104-
23 1, 1 10 Stat. 3048) to uncover documents regarding many famous individuals. The Smoking
Gun scans the documents and places them on the organization's Web site, where they are
available before the entire world. In addition, the site contains copies of arrest photographs of
famous individuals taken during their booking for crimes. In the modern world, one mistake can
cause embarrassment and harassment on a global scale.
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Public facingWeb Sites are also a source of information. Higher education institutions,
which should be especially careful with data because ofFERPA (Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act; 20 USC 1232g), often place their
students'
information in public view, especially
when celebrating their
students'
achievements. Pages listing honors students, Dean's List
students or recent graduates often contain information ranging from eMail address and city of
residence to full phone number and address.
The biggest problem with public records is that as the government and private industry
become more interested in knowing everything that they can about a given individual,
information brokers will offer to perform a panoptic sort on the various existing data sources and
combine them together to provide a complete picture regarding a given individual. A partial list
of information brokers includes LexisNexs (http://www.lexisnexus.com/), ChoicePoint
(http://www.choicepoint.com/), Intelius (http://www.intelius.com/), US Search
http://www.ussearch.com/consumer/index.jsp) Hoovers (http://www.hoovers.com/free/) and
GuideStar (http://www.guidestar.org/). The information these companies can retrieve includes
name, address, phone number, age, SSN, property information, criminal check, background
check, death records, marriage records and divorce records. Hoovers provides business
information, although if the business is a sole proprietorship or partnership, the query may return
the home address and telephone number of the proprietors. GuideStar provides information about
non-profit organizations, including their tax returns and financial statements.
Name Seeding
One way to track the usage of your personal information is through the "seed
name"
technique (Garfinkel 180). With name seeding, an individual uses slight variations of their name
or address for the various catalogs, magazines and mailing lists they request. For example, an
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individual might use their middle initial for one magazine, one without the middle initial, and
another with a misspelled last name. When they receive unsolicited junk mail, they can examine
the address label to examine the form or spelling of their name or address, thereby determining
what source provided their information to the bulk mailer. While this does not enable an
individual to prevent information sharing, it does provide them with the knowledge ofwhat
organization is sharing their information, allowing them to consider canceling their subscription
with that company.
The amount of available information will only increase over time as database utilization
increases. Individuals should be very aware of the contents of their wallet, and leave their Social
Security card at home. In addition, they should not carry more credit cards than they need. The
issue regarding public records is a difficult one, as the blame belongs to government agencies
and organizations that individuals have no control over. Any organization dealing with an
individual's panoptic information must be extremely diligent with that information, especially
when storing it electronically. Publicly available information presents a dangerous threat to
individual privacy, and raises the Privacy Level Indicator to 3.75. Most individuals have credit or
debit cards, and use them often. In addition, most individuals do not understand the necessity of
shredding documents that contain even the smallest amount of financial information. The
ubiquitous existence of credit and debit cards, the high percentage of individuals that carry their
Social Security Card, and the lack of education regarding proper disposal of financial




The purpose of this case study is to provide a concrete example of the amount ofpanoptic
information readily available in databases worldwide. In addition, this case study provides
examples that support the previously discussed changes to the Privacy Level Indicator. Viewing
actual panoptic information retrieved from a small-scale panoptic sort reaffirms the danger of the
many threats to individual privacy.
When attempting to uncover panoptic information describing an individual, one generally
has a few pieces of information as a starting point. This information could include their true
name, persistent digital nym, a username, phone number, eMail address, employer, educational
institution, Web Site address, or home address. One can gather information from a variety of
sources, including eMail messages, signature text on eMail or newsgroup postings, personal Web
Site, conversation, phone book, instant messaging chat, or online message board postings. Using
this information as a starting point, one can then begin their search for information regarding the
individual.
This case study gathered its information from publicly available sources, without
purchasing any information from a
broker. One can purchase a large amount of information from
one of the many information brokers
throughout the world. In addition, information is
increasingly available from more
"reputable"
sources, such as ChoicePoint or
LexisNexis.9
This
information often includes the individual's SSN, address and telephone number, background
check, criminal record and
employment history. Information brokers have existed for decades.
9
The reputation of any organization that
collects and sells personal information, regardless of their practices and
who they sell the information to,
should be called into question.
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However, technological advances have enabled greater levels of information collection and
sharing.
Consider an individual represented by two persistent digital nyms. To protect the
individual's privacy, we will call them
"nymA"
and "nymB". nymA was known at the beginning
of the search, as was the address of the individual's personal Web Site and true name. The Web
Site of nymA contains plenty or worthwhile information. The first relevant piece of information
is a picture ofnymA smiling and wearing a suit. The Alternate Text for the image describes the
image as a "picture ofnymA wearing a suit". The site is hosted on a TimeWarner free hosting
site, possibly signaling that nymA does not have the money or resources to host the site through
a provider. One the front page, we are greeted by a message from nymA, which includes a new
email address used by the persistent digital nym. According to the messages, nymA has recently
learned to use Adobe Photoshop 7.01, Macromedia Fireworks MX 6.0, and is planning to
digitize some videos using Adobe Premiere 6.5. The site also contains information regarding
nymA's level of education, career aspirations, hobbies and interests, as well as a containing a
copy of the individual's resume. The site mentions that nymA is an avid video gamer, and holds
numerous world records. The site details a number ofnymA's beliefs, including those on code
validation and site accessibility. The site also contains a Privacy Policy, and details nymA's
beliefs regarding privacy.
Using VisualRoute 7.0g to analyze nymA's personal Web Site uncovers some very
interesting information. The first interesting piece of information is that VisualRoute 7.0g was
able to trace nymA's domain name. The WHOIS reply from nymA's domain contains the
address and phone number for the domain's administrative contact, whom happens to be the
same nymA that is the subject of this case study. With the popularity of the Web, and the
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increasing number ofpeople who desire to register a domain themselves, the information
contained in the WHOIS database is extremely dangerous. TheWHOIS record often contains an
individual's home address and phone number, if they registered the domain themselves.
A search on Yahoo! for
"nymA"
returns eight results, three ofwhich refer to the
individual's persistent digital nym. From these results, an individual could determine that nymA
authored two papers published in peer-reviewed journals, and determine the title, volume and
publication date of each. In addition, the search results show that nymA had a fantasy drum corp,
which finished in
10th
place of the Fantasy Drum Corps International (FDCI) tournament in an
unknown year.
Of the five results that were false positives, three referred to individuals that died before
the nymA in question was born. The other two results provided some interesting information of
their own. One is from the University ofNotre Dame, and is a listing of all sophomores with last
names beginning with the letters M-Z who are members of that university's Arts & Letters
Science Honors program. While it does not refer to the nymA in question, the page does provide
the last name, first name, college, major, address, phone number and eMail address of its nymA,
along with the thirty-three other people that are a part of that group. This is an incredible amount
ofpublic information for a university to provide regarding its students, most likely without the
students'
consent. The final false positive is aMarine Corps promotion listing, which includes
the
individuals'
name and the last four digits of their SSN.
A newsgroup search for nymA returns 87 results, all ofwhich refer to the nymA in
question. The first piece of information gathered from these postings is that the person
represented by the persistent digital nym ofnymA was active in posting messages, from June 6,
1997 to July 2, 2002. It is very easy to connect the postings to the same nymA, as they were sent
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from the same email address, which was valid at the time for the nymA in question. It appears
that nymA was unaware of the automated spiderbots that crawl through newsgroups, extracting
eMail addresses from postings and adding them to spam mailing lists. Otherwise, nymA would
have used a fake or altered email address in nymA's postings. Over time, nymA adds a signature
tag to each posting, containing at first the nym, then adding aWeb Site address, then adding
quotes from famous philosophers, and finally adding industry certifications that nymA had
earned. Since the signature adds to the foundation of the persistent digital nym, one only needs to
associate any one of the postings to the nymA in
question.10
One can gather a very large amount of information from these postings: nymA is a fan of
the Atari video game systems and has ordered some games from a company named
O'
Shea Ltd.
nymA is a very devoted fan of the band Queen, having posted manymessages relating to them
personally and their music. nymA is a fan of snowmobiling, having once gone 100 Mph (Miles
per hour) on a Ski-Doo Mach Z snowmobile. nymA is apparently a fan of the Beach Boys,
having posted several messages mourning the passing ofBeach Boy Carl Wilson in 1998. nymA
apparently was a fan ofHP (Hewlett-Packard), having owned an HP 5PSE scanner and an HP
6020EP CD writer connected to a laptop. nymA is a fan of the bands Dream Theater and Rush,
and loves hearing their music played on television during sporting events or other coverage.
In 2000, nymA had tickets for a Dream Theater concert in Pittsburgh that nymA was
trying to sell for $24 apiece. The show unexpectedlywas 21 and over only, and according to the
post nymA was not 21 years old at the time. In June of2000, nymA had trouble with an Abit
VT6X4 motherboard with a Pentium III 667EB processor runningWindows 98SE. Even after
10
This is not entirely true, as someone could be posing
as nymA, copying the basic signature style from other
postings. An analysis of the body of each posting shows that the grammatical style is consistent in each posting,
something that an expert could
certify. We shall discover later that nymA eventually started using PGP to digitally
sign all messages, which is a stronger guarantee of their authenticity, but also adds a surer layer of tracking to the
persistent digital nym.
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downloading the shutdown patch, the machine still would not shut down properly. The core
voltage on nymA's PHI CPU (Central Processing Unit) was 1.6V. Later, we find more details of
that system: AMaxtor DiamondMax Plus hard drive running on a Promise Hard Drive
controller, a SoundBlaster Live! Platinum sound card, a Creative Labs Annihilator2 video card
and an Encore 8X DVD drive. nymA seems knowledgeable regarding computers, posting a fair
number ofmessages relating to troubleshooting and configuration issues. nymA does not like
Hollywood Records, promising not to purchase anything from the company. nymA has been to
the Rock and Roll Hall ofFame, and viewed articles of clothing from many ofnymA's favorite
artists.
nymA apparently does not hold a favorable opinion of the A+ Certification test. nymA
appears to side with nVidia in the video card wars, complaining of the presence of 3dfx zealots
in nVidia newsgroups. We later discover that nymA is not a fan of the A+ Certification book by
Mike Myers. A fake Web page tricked nymA into thinking that a drunk driver killed the
drummer for the Dave Matthews Band. nymA once had an HP 970 DeskJet printer that would
occasionally print nothing but ASCII characters across the page. Professional wrestling's Ted
DiBiase, the "Million DollarMan", inspired nymA as his signature at one point contained many
religious quotes from the wrestler turned public speaker. nymA apparently had plenty of trouble
with an Asus A7A266 motherboard, as there are many posts relating to issues with this product.
The purpose of reprinting some of this material is not to bore, but to prove a point: The
newsgroup archives can contain a vast
amount of information about an individual, depending on
the frequency and content of their posts. The information repeated in the previous paragraphs is
simply extracted facts and quotes
that any person could obtain legally from the Google archives.
The posts are timestamped with the day, month, year and time of the posting, providing a
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timeline ofnymA's experiences in cyberspace. Anyone with training as a profiler or psychologist
could probably construct a thorough profile about someone from this information.
Amazon.com is no less informing, especially if a user has created a wish list, baby
registry or wedding registry. Any of these lists are searchable by an individual's name, and
minimally provide more information regarding a person's life, and can provide personal details,
depending on the content of each list. A search for Wish Lists created by nymA turns up seven
results. One of these results lists the same town as where the nymA in question was born, which
was determined from nymA's Web Site. Thus far, it seems like a match. A quick perusal of the
items in the Wish List confirms that the items are definitely along the interest lines of the nymA
in question.
TheWish List ofnymA contains plenty of interesting information. One of the most
interesting facts regarding Amazon.com Wish Lists is that the timestamps marking an item's
addition to theirWish List greatly enables an observer to examine their growth ofknowledge and
interests. On September 7, 2001, nymA added seven trance, relaxation and instrumental CDs to
the Wish List. It seems evident that around this time nymA discovered this genre ofmusic. In
October 2001, six DVD movies and concert videos were added to the Wish List, signifying a
new interest in DVDs. Perhaps the true name behind nymA had a DVD player. Numerous books
on AI (Artificial Intelligence) and philosophy appear on the Wish List during October and
November of2001. Authors includeWilliam A. Stubblefield, George Boole, George Luger and
Ivan Bratko, all ofwhom are well respected experts in artificial intelligence and machine
learning. Also listed are a numerous versions ofAristotle's
"Physics"
and a translation of
FriedrichWilhelm Nietzsche's "Thus Spoke Zarathustra". Also added to the list at this time were
numerous books by the spiritualist Aleister Crowley, and Anton Szandor LaVey, known as the
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father of the modern Church of Satan. It appears that perhaps nymA was into all various forms
and manners ofphilosophy. Also from this period are many books by Issac Asimov (including
"I,
Robot"
and a guide written by Asimov on the Bible and Shakespeare), DVDs containing
"Transformers"
episodes, a Britney Spears wall calendar, a CD by Jewel, a number of classical
music CDs, and a Christmas CD by Christina Aguilera.
In January 2002, we see Henry Bieler's "Food is You BestMedicine", signaling that
perhaps nymA was searching for dieting or health advice. On July 10, 2002, there are a number
of cordless phones added to the list, signaling that perhaps a phone purchase was on the horizon.
In October 2002, we see the classic "Design Patterns". In November 2002, nymA added books
on Adobe Premiere, signaling that perhaps nymA was planning to do some video editing. At the
beginning of 2003, some intensive theory books appear on the list, beginning with a book by
Milton L. Mueller on the DNS system; a book on converged network architectures; a number of
books on intellectual property and cyberspace law; and many books on swarm theory, chaos
theory and emergence. The newest item on the list is a VHS version of the classic movie "Cloak
and Dagger". From the Wish List, you can find a link to all reviews written by nymA, and learn
that nymA has much respect for Bouhrez A. Fourazan, and very little respect for Clifford Stoll.
Not only are the products on Amazon.com lists revealing, but an individual can choose to
put plenty ofpersonal information into their profile, including date ofbirth, physical description,
eMail address and comments for products added to the list.
Over time, the true name behind nymA developed a second persistent digital nym: nymB.
Determining the second nym and connecting the two nyms to the same person is actually very
simple, and requires only searching for nymA's eMail address in Yahoo!. This search returns one
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very important result: A posting to a message board by a user named nymB from the same eMail
address. This clearly attaches the nymA to the
nymB.11
A search on Yahoo! for
"nymB"
returns four results, one ofwhich is the previously
mentioned post. From this posting we can determine that nymB loves the "King's
Quest"
series
of computer games, and has loved them from an early age.
At first glance, the second result, which contains user profiles from the Web site
http://www.dalantech.com, appears to be a false positive, as the eMail address for the nymB
listed does not match any of the ones known for nymB or nymA. Inspection of the other user
profiles on the page seems to reveal that none of the users (including nymB) have legitimate
eMail addresses. All of the addresses appear to follow a similar pattern, which users a strange
sounding domain name (many of them involving the word
"keyboards"
in the domain name).
The address for the nymB listed on the page is Iost3@crawling0301avenderkeyboards.net. No
other relevant information is given that might help to determine whether this nymB is the nymB
in question. A trace using Visual Route 7.0g to the domain
http://www.crawling0301avenderkeyboards.net failed at the DNS query, which Visual Route was
unable to resolve. A WHOIS lookup to the lookup server at whois.internic.net for the domain
http://www.crawling0301avenderkeyboards.net using DreamSysSoft's ANT 2.7 (Advanced Net
Tools) returned the result that the domain did not exits. These queries prove that this address is
not a valid address for the nymB listed. After examining the addresses listed for other users, it
appears that the site places fake eMail addresses in a user's profile if they do not enter a real
address. Further inspection is required to determine whether the nymB listed on the site is the
nymB in question.
"
Again it must be stated that someone could be impersonating the true name behind the nyms. Stylistically,
messages from nymB will fit the pattern of those created by nymA.
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The user nymB has written two posts to the message boards at
http://www.dalantech.com, and a link exists in the user's profile to display all of the posts written
by a given user. The two posts by this nymB have some revealing traits: They are both to a
thread in the networking forum created by nymB, and they are regarding the procedures for
wiring Category 5 keystone jacks for placement in wall plates. It seems that the true name behind
this nymB was having trouble getting the wired keystone jacks to operate properly. The style of
the postings seems to match that of the nymB in question. Examination ofnymA's resume
(available from nymA's Web Site) shows that nymA does have experience with wiring keystone
jacks and installing premise wiring. So it appears that a search result that originally seemed like a
false positive has turned into a fairly certain match.
The third result from the Yahoo! search for
"nymB"
leads to two posts in the forums at
the Concord Blue Devils drum corps site. Earlier we established that the true name behind nymA
is a drum corps fan, and once had a fantasy drum corps team, so it seems that this nymB might
be a match to the one in question. Clicking on the username reveals the
users'
profiles, and the
profile for nymB reveals that it is a match, as this nymB lists an eMail address that matches one
of the eMail addresses established for nymA. The other attributes listed (real name and age) also
match the nymA in question. From the two posts, we can determine that nymB does not like the
Blue Devils 2002 show because nymB thinks that it is boring and does not push the envelope
enough.
The final result returned from the Yahoo! search is a posting on
http://www.resellerratings.com regarding QbitPC.com, a computer retailer. nymB was
apparently surprised by all of the negative ratings that QbitPC.com had been receiving, stating
that nymB had ordered from them a number of times and was always fully satisfied.
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One of the more disturbing examples of information available on Web is the phone book
feature of the Google search engine. The Google search engine can return the name, address and
phone number of any publicly listed phone number in the US. All that is required to find an
individual's information is to type their name and state of residence into the search engine. For
example, to search for the residence information of a John Doe living in California, the search
would be "John Doe CA". Successful search results include links for Yahoo! Maps and
Mapquest, which allow the searcher to create a map to the residence with the click of a button.
Searches for nymA returned no results, signaling that nymA does not have a telephone and
residence listed under nymA's true name, or the number is unlisted. In addition, Google supports
"reverse phone number lookups", which use a phone number to discover the associated name
and location. An example of a reverse phone number search would be "555-555-4674". If
Google does not provide the requested information, there are many phone number and reverse
phone number directories freely available on the Web.
By default, Google provides the contact information of every publicly listed residence
US. An individual must contact Google in order to have their name removed from Google's
online directory. The fact that Google chose an opt-out policy rather than an opt-in policy shows
that the organization is not concerned with individual privacy.
Public Policy
The USA PATRIOT ACT: Enabling Government Monitoring
The government passed the USA PATRIOT ACT (Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism; Public Law
107-
56) quickly after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to enable law enforcement to better combat
terrorism. The legislation provides the government with an unprecedented ability to monitor all
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aspects of the life of a citizen that is "believed to be involved in terrorism". One of the problems
with the USA PATRIOT ACT is the definition of terrorism and terrorist. One only needs to
remember theMcCarthy Communist hearings to understand why the USA PATRIOT ACT
presents a scary proposition, as the act opens the door for widespread racism and ethnic
stereotyping by the government. In addition, the USA PATRIOT ACT redefined a number of
crimes, including Web Site hacking, as acts of terrorism. The act defines all instances ofhacking
as terrorist acts and states that punishment should follow along those lines. Less vicious crimes
such as Web Site defacement or executing a DoS (Denial of Service) attack could result in a
lengthy prison sentence, a loss of computer privileges and possibly deportation (for foreign-born
defendants). This is a terrible categorization for hacking and overextends the suppressive powers
of the government. Defacing a Web Site is a minor offense when compared with terrorist attacks
such as the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole or the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Although the legislation is supposed to combat terrorism, many experts question the
nearly unlimited powers granted to law enforcement by the USA PATRIOT ACT. According to
Debbie Howlett, ". . .critics say it's a threat to civil liberties. And three states
- Hawaii, Alaska
and Vermont - plus 134 cities and counties have approved resolutions calling for a repeal of the
act. . (3A). Citizens are standing against the sweeping powers enacted by the USA PATRIOT
ACT because it threatens civil liberties to the point where George Orwell's
"1984"
seems more
fact than fiction. It gives the government unlimited access to all of an individual's panoptic
information, from their grocery shopping habits to their library records. According to Howlett,
"The 342-page Patriot Act was signed into law six weeks after the Sept. 1 1 terrorist attacks. It
expands the power of the federal government to wiretap cellphones, check library records,
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eavesdrop on computer use, access financial records and detain terrorism suspects without
charges"
(3A).
The USA PATRIOT ACT has greatly altered the way law enforcement agencies operate.
According to Miller, "Under this act, authorities no longer need to obtain a court order to initiate
online surveillance. . (371). In addition, law enforcement now has the ability to detain suspects
indefinitely without formally filing charges against them. This provision changes the procedures
of law enforcement from the traditional "innocent until proven
guilty"
to a more tyrannical
"guilty until proven innocent". According to Caron Carlson, "One provision (Section 215) allows
the FBI to demand business records, such as a subject's medical history, Internet use patterns and
gun purchases, with an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, even if the
subject is not a suspected terrorist. Critics say the order amounts to a rubber
stamp"
("Rights
Advocates"). The FISC (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) is a court system that requires
far less supporting evidence than the traditional court system for issuing a warrant. The USA
PATRIOT ACT relaxed the guidelines for taking a case before the FISC. According to Carlson,
"Another provision (Section 505) gives the government greater power to use what is
known as a "national security
letter"
also known as an administrative subpoena to obtain
records such as credit reports, financial documents, and telephone and email bills. A national
security letter does not require law enforcement to show probable cause, nor does it require even
the low standard ofjudicial review required by a FISA Court
order"
("Rights Advocates").
Outraged citizens have been protesting the USA PATRIOT ACT since its enactment. "In
Berkeley, Calif, public library director Jackie Griffin purges records of all returned books each




According to Amy Goldstein,
"In Seattle, the public library printed 3,000 bookmarks to alert patrons that the FBI could,
in the name ofnational security, seek permission from a secret federal court to inspect
their reading and computer records
- and prohibit librarians from revealing that a search
had taken place. . . And in Hillsboro, Ore., Police ChiefRon Louie has ordered his
officers to refuse to assist any federal terrorism investigations that his department
believes violate state law or constitutional rights".
While citizens are fighting against the USA PATRIOT ACT, select government officials
are trying to strengthen its powers. "Attorney General John Ashcroft asked Congress Thursday
[5 June 2003] to widen the USA Patriot Act so that suspected terrorists can be held indefinitely
before trials and to let him seek the death penalty or life imprisonment for any terrorist
act"
(MSNBC "Ashcroft"). Providing the USG with unlimited powers of surveillance and retention is
a threat to every citizen, and it did not take the administration long to exploit the new law. "The
[Justice] department's inspector general found 'significant
problems'
in the Bush
administration's actions toward 762 foreigners held on immigration violations after the [Sept.
11] attacks. Only one, Zacarias Moussaoui, has been charged in the United States with a
terrorism-related crime; 505 have been
deported"
(MSNBC "Ashcroft").
From the first day of the legislation's enactment it was clear that the USA PATRIOT
ACT might be
"patriotic"
in the sense that "Americans are superior", but it was definitely not
constitutional. The mere idea of choosing the name "USA PATRIOT
ACT"
for the legislation
signals that government officials knew that getting the legislation passed and supported would
require more marketing savvy than political skill. By choosing to name the legislation the "USA
PATRIOT ACT", the government was attempting to ride the high tide of flag-waving patriotism
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that arose after September 11, 2001, while simultaneously asserting that anyone who does not
support a bill named the "PATRIOT
ACT"
is unpatriotic.
The FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) has used the USA PATRIOT ACT to allow
secret searches and seizures by classifying them as intelligence investigations rather than
criminal investigations. By feeding off the FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt) created by the
events of September 11, 2001, the FBI thought it could freely invade
individuals'
privacy.
According to Dan Eggen,
"To civil libertarians and many defense lawyers, the changes pose a threat to the privacy
and due-process rights of civilians because they essentially eliminate. . .the traditional
boundaries separating criminal and intelligence investigations. As a result, these critics
say, FBI agents and federal prosecutors will conduct many more searches and seizures in




Before the USA PATRIOT ACT, the FBI had to separate the intelligence-gathering portion of
an investigation from the criminal investigation portion (Eggen A01). Now, the FBI can
categorize an incident as a counterterrorism case from the start, allowing intelligence and
criminal investigators to work together (Eggen A01). One must question who will be defining
terrorism and to what extent the FBI will be willing to operate against innocent individuals for
the purpose of gratuitous information gathering sessions. The FBI hopes that the new rules
closing the gap between intelligence gathering and
criminal investigations will allow them to





Past cases in which discord between FBI agents and criminal investigators caused a
suspect to evade capture prove the necessity of restructuring. However, we must wonder how far
the FBI will carry their new methods of operation. According to Eggen, "According to a study
released this week [December 2003] by Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, Justice and the FBI have sharply increased the number of terrorism cases they are
pursuing since the 2001 attacks, although most of the 6,400 people referred to prosecutors were
never charged with a crime related to
terrorism"
(A01). Eggen quotedMichael A. Vatis, a former
Justice Department and FBI official, as saying that the new changes were necessary but oversight
was critical to assure that agents did not overreach in their investigations, which the prior
structure prevented (A01). We can only hope that someone provides the necessary oversight and
guidance to prevent the FBI turning the US into a quasi-police state.
Unfortunately, we must consider the worst-case scenario, as the FBI has a long history of
abusing its power that continues today. According to an AP (Associated Press) report,
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been collecting information on the tactics,
training and organization of antiwar demonstrators, The New York Times reported in
Sunday editions. . .The memo analyzed legal activities such as recruiting demonstrators,
as well as illegal ones such as using false documentation to gain access to secured
sites. . (MSNBC "FBI collecting").
The FBI claims that monitoring is necessary to prevent anarchists and terrorist groups from
committing violent acts, yet they are inadvertently (or intentionally) monitoring both threatening
and non-threatening activities, and invading the basic right to free speech. Repeated abuses by
the FBI during the 1960s and 1970s (including spying on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) led to
many of the rules that have restricted the FBI's operations for the past two decades (MSNBC
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"FBI collecting"). Attorney General John Ashcroft relaxed most of those rules after September
11,2001.
Fortunately, the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), EPIC, EFF (Electronic
Frontier Foundation) and others will not accept the USG's trampling of individual rights.
"The American Civil Liberties Union is challenging the FBI's use of expanded powers to
compel Internet service providers to turn over information about their customers or
subscribers. . .The FBI can issue national security letters, or NSLs, without a judge's
approval in terrorism and espionage cases. They require telephone companies, Internet
service providers, banks, credit bureaus and other businesses to produce highly personal




"The lawsuit challenges as unconstitutional one of several types ofnational security
letters used by the FBI in counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. The
letters in question involve records held by Internet service providers about their clients,




The FBI is gathering data in secret, without a warrant and the Bureau does not disclose what
happens to the data once it is gathered. The FBI could be adding the information it gathers to its
existing data collection and enhancing its knowledge regarding every citizen in the US. In fact,
because of the USA PATRIOT ACT, the FBI can monitor someone without due cause, and does
not need to prove any justification regarding why they are monitoring an individual to the
individual or the organization from which they are gathering information (MSNBC "ACLU
battles").
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Most actions performed under the USA PATRIOT ACT have been under veiled secrecy
to protect them from the opinion of the American public. The veil of secrecy has only intensified
feelings regarding the USA PATRIOT ACT, and resistance to the legislation has been so fierce
that Attorney General John Ashcroft and President George W. Bush have been separately touring
the nation in an attempt to rally support for the law. At every stop, they are met with applause
from the people listening to their respective speeches (mostly law enforcement officials), while
outside protesters demonstrate in outrage. As the election draws near, each is stepping up their
campaign to gain support for the USA PATRIOT ACT's renewal. There is hope in the signs of
dwindling support in Congress. According to the AP, "Several conservative Republicans have
joined liberal Democrats in saying that portions of the law are too intrusive on
Americans'
lives.
They are threatening to allow the provisions to die at the end of next year. Some want to impose
more judicial oversight of how police and prosecutors conduct
investigations"
(MSNBC "Bush
urges"). In 2004, Ashcroft released some statistics on PATRIOT ACT usage in an attempt to
convince Congress not to weaken the law when it comes up for renewal in 2005. An AP story
covering Ashcroft 's announcement stated that "Powers permitted under the Patriot Act have also
been used in investigations involving potential school bomb attacks, computer hackers, child
pornography, violent fugitives and illegal weapons
sales"
("Ashcroft details"). Defining child
pornography and hacking as terrorism is an interesting way of deflecting criticism that law
enforcement officials are overreaching with the powers given to them by the PATRIOT ACT,
but it fits with the government's recent practices. One subject that Ashcroft's report did not detail
was whether law enforcement officials had seized library or video rental records, which they
were not able to do before the PATRIOT ACT. According to the AP report, "The report did not
say whether the FBI had used its authority to obtain library or bookstore records. That
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information is classified, but Ashcroft last year issued a declassified statement saying that, up to
that point, the power had not been
used"
("Ashcroft details"). A Congressional vote one week
prior to the release ofAshcroft's report narrowly upheld the ability to search library records. The
mere fact that top ranking US officials feel that it is necessary to trumpet the law's benefits years
before its renewal is a sign that they question its perception and future.
The fight against the PATRIOT ACT is still underway, with victories slowlymounting
for those challenging the act. On June 15, 2005, the US House ofRepresentatives voted to
disallow investigators to examine library records or bookstore sales receipts. This vote presents
an opening for Congress to repeal additional powers granted under the PATRIOT ACT during
the act's sunset period.
Collecting the data
A number of countries are participating in extensive information gathering. According to
a story reported by the AP in April 2003, "Over the past 18 months, the U.S. government has
bought access to data on hundreds ofmillions of residents of 10 Latin American countries
apparently without their consent or knowledge allowing myriad federal agencies to track
foreigners entering and living in the United
States"
(MSNBC "U.S. buys"). Despite claims to the
contrary, the USG is currently involved in practices that undermine the basic privacy rights of
individuals worldwide.
Citizens ofLatin American countries pose no threat to US citizens, yet the USG feels that
it is necessary to purchase the personal information ofhundreds ofmillions ofLatin Americans.
This privacy invasion does not involve citizens from certainMiddle Eastern nations proven to
have committed terrorist acts against the US. This is an intrusion against the people of Latin
America, who at worst sneak across the US border and saturate the job and welfare markets.
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Even so, illegal immigration generally tends to involve a few individuals from a few select
countries, and not anywhere near one million people, much less hundreds ofmillions ofpeople.
The same article also states, "The practice broadens a trend that has an
information-
hungry U.S. government increasingly buying personal data on Americans and foreigners alike




"Fighting terrorism on the home front has given the U.S. government a big appetite for
information, with records such as credit reports, charity lists and traffic incidents being
scoured for leads in the name ofnational security. This zeal to cross-check and profile




The USG is buying and warehousing data on all foreigners and Americans, regardless of those
individuals'
criminal or social background. The USG has repeatedly claimed that the data
warehousing and data mining techniques in question comprise a multi-faceted anti-terrorism
system, aimed at making the country safer from terrorist threats. Assuming that is a true
statement (which further analysis will soundly disprove), each individual must question to what
extend they are willing to sacrifice individual privacy and leisure to prevent terrorism. Given
previous operations of the USG, believing that warehousing and mining of data is truly only for
anti-terrorism preventions is a monumental mistake. These events show that the USG is never
concerned only with foreigners and suspected terrorists, but with every citizen of the world.
Regarding the information purchased on Latin American citizens, the data gathered
includes phone numbers (listed and unlisted), addresses, passport numbers and driving records,
originally received from organizations
that register voters or issue national IDs or driver's
12




licenses (MSNBC "U.S. buys"). According to the article, the approximately 3 1 million residents
ofColombia have the most fear: "In Colombia, ChoicePoint buys the entire country's citizen ID
database, including each resident's date and place ofbirth, passport and national ID number,
parentage and physical
description"
(MSNBC "U.S. buys"). The situation threatening Colombian
citizens begins with the country itself: No country should have such a comprehensive database of
its citizens (although later we will discover that the USG is trying to develop a database ofUS
citizens). National database systems are a threat to privacy and humanity. Someone should first
convince the government ofColombia to destroy its database. That the USG would support the
actions of the Colombian government by purchasing the entire database only shows how
invasive our government is willing to become in its quest for data.
Worse, it appears that the government does not care about the accuracy of the data
gathered, or its origin. According to Carlson,
"Thus far, the government appears unconcerned about regulating its sources ofpersonal
data. The FBI's use of commercial databases has grown 9,600 percent over the last
decade, according to EPIC. The bureau uses credit records, property records, professional
licenses, driver's licenses and other data purchased from companies such as ChoicePoint
Inc., ofAlpharetta, Ga., and LexisNexis, ofDayton, Ohio, as well as credit reporting
agencies such as Atlanta-based Equifax Inc., Experian Information Solutions Inc., of
CostaMesa, Calif, and Trans Union LLC, ofChicago. But none of these companies is
held accountable for the truth or accuracy of the information it
sells"
("Who's Minding").
According to Sullivan, ChoicePoints records on a given consumer, sometimes 20 pages or
longer, are often riddled with errors ("ChoicePoint files"). Sullivan continues to recount the story
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ofDeborah Pierce, a privacy advocate who managed to obtain a copy ofher information from
ChoicePoint. According to Sullivan,
"A dozen former addresses were listed, along with neighbors and their phone numbers.
Almost 20 people were listed as relatives - and their neighbors were listed, too. There
were cars she supposedly owned, businesses she supposedly worked for. But the more




"Under former addresses, an ex-boyfriend's address was listed. Pierce said she never
lived there, and in fact, he moved into that house after they broke up. The report also
listed three automobiles she never owned and three companies listed that she never
owned or worked for. Under the relatives section, her sister's ex-husband was listed. And




Richard Smith, another privacy advocate, also purchased his information from ChoicePoint.
According to Sullivan, "Some of the mistakes on Smith's report were comical: That his wife had
a child three years before theywere married, that he had been married previously to another
woman, and most absurd, that he had died in
1976"
("ChoicePoint files"). Of course,
ChoicePoint does not provide consumers with any way to correct their personal information in
the company's files, leaving consumers to worry that mistakes on someone else's part could cost
them employment, a loan, or cause legal trouble. The cross-purpose use of data is also
questionable. According to Carlson,
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"The question of how data is used by the government is at the center ofprivacy and
database security concerns. Evolving data mining technologies create new ways to
manipulate, share and apply data, enabling information gathered for one purpose to be
used for
another"
("Who's Minding"). In some countries, reusing data collected for one
purpose for another dissimilar purpose is illegal. In post-September 1 1, 2001 US, it is not.
The uncontrolled sale of data submits the data to inaccuracies and makes it easier for the
data to end up in places far from where it started. In July 2003, privacy experts discovered that
Batteries.com committed multiple violations of its own privacy policy as well as ofTRUSTe's
membership requirements (whom certified
Batteries.com'
s policy). Columnist David Berlind,
who had purchased batteries from Batteries.com, had his information placed in theMen's
Journal subscription database without his approval (Berlind "TRUSTe issues"). A further
investigation found that Batteries.com shared information with a third party (a violation of its
privacy policy) and shared the information without informing TRUSTe or Batteries.com
customers (a violation of its TRUSTe certification) (Berlind "TRUSTe issues"). The biggest
problem with this scenario is that one accidental sale to a company that does not respect privacy
could cause a widespread disbursement of
consumers'
personal information. Consider the
following scenario: An organization with a privacy policy stating that it will not sell customer
data to third parties sells its customer data to a single third party entity, either on purpose or by
accident. That is a violation of the organization's privacy policy. If the privacy policy of the
company that purchased the data allows that organization to resell the data to additional third
parties, then it can resell the data as much as it desires without causing an infraction against its
own privacy policy. One mistake can cause an uninhibited spread of
individuals'
personal
information. Unfortunately, the growth of "information
brokers"
has been uncontrolled, and in
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late 2004 and 2005 privacy advocates worst fears came true: Multiple instances of data theft
occurred at ChoicePoint and LexisNexis.
These incidents revealed the dangers ofbecoming a database nation, because the
information was gained not through cracking or other electronic means, but through social
engineering and finding weaknesses in the
companies'
business processes. In the case of
ChoicePoint, criminals posed as legitimate companies by opening 50 new accounts with the
company and received consumer data through normal transactions with ChoicePoint (Sullivan
"Database giant"). According to an AP report, "In this case, the thieves posing as check-
cashing companies or debt collection firms provided business licenses that appeared to be
legitimate and used the names of real people with clean criminal records. The company caught




The criminals then used the data they purchased to commit crimes involving massive
identity theft. The stolen information included names, addresses, SSNs, and credit reports,
among other information (Sullivan "Database giant"). Although ChoicePoint originally notified
only 30,000 to 35,000 consumers, the company eventually notified 145,000 nationwide, and the
final total could be much higher. According to Sullivan, "The Atlanta-based company says it has
10 billion records on individuals and businesses, and sells data to 40 percent of the nation's top
1,000 companies. It also has contracts with 35 government agencies, including several law
enforcement
agencies"
("Database giant"). ChoicePoint does an exceptional amount ofbusiness
with the information that it has collected, with revenues of $900 million annually. In part, due to
fears of retaliation from the Attorney Generals of 38 states, and threats of contract cancellations,
ChoicePoint sent the notification letters, and has offered to pay for credit monitoring services for
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one year for all of the potential victims (AP "ChoicePoint to rescreen"). The latest reporting had
uncovered 750 people who actually suffered identity theft resulting from the ChoicePoint
compromise (AP "ChoicePoint to rescreen").
In the case ofLexisNexis, thieves accessed the company's databases through electronic
intrusion. According to an AP Report, "Using stolen passwords from legitimate customers,
intruders accessed personal information on as many as 32,000 U.S. citizens in a database owned
by the information broker LexisNexis, the company
said"
("Another big"). This is startling and
disturbing, because not only does one have to worry about the large information brokers, but
they also have to worry about the security practices and business processes of all of the
companies that execute transactions with information brokers. A customer's poor security
practices could spell disaster for their partners. The most startling fact might be the value
LexisNexis gives to
consumers'
information. According to the AP report, "The database that was
compromised, called Accurint, sells reports for $4.50 each that include an individual's Social
Security number, past addresses, date ofbirth and voter registration information, including party
affiliation"
("Another big"). It is an interesting point to note that the database is maintained by
the Seisint unit ofLexisNexis, which the company purchased in August (AP "Another big").
Seisint was previously know as the company behind the controversial Matrix law enforcement
database project, originally funded by a number of states, all ofwhom eventually withdrew from
the project, citing security and privacy concerns (AP "Another big").
One can only hope that ChoicePoint and LexisNexis will notify all effected customers,
and greatly improve their processes. As it stands, both companies could be in risk of violations of
current legislations because of the failure of their internal processes. One does have to wonder
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though, ifpotential foreign victims have been notified of the breaches. It stands to reason that
most, ifnot all of the victims were from the US, but what if they were not?
TIA: The Government's DataWarehouse
The pinnacle of the government's privacy invasions is the TIA (Total Information
Awareness) system. The government seeks to store all of the panoptic information describing an
individual in a massive data warehouse, including images of their face, video of their gait,
financial information, personal information, shopping information, medical information and
professional information. With all of this information at their disposal, the government could
easilymonitor and track residents of the US. The government plans to use advanced data mining
techniques to develop correlations between individuals and their activities. The original logo for
the LAO (Information Awareness Office), which oversees the TIA system and related programs,
adequately justifies the fear generated by the project:
If a giant eyeball casting a gaze over the surface of the planet is not scary enough, then consider
that the Latin text at the bottom ("SCIENTIA EST POTENTIA") translates to "Knowledge is
power". Shortly after the logo made its debut, the IAO removed it from theirWeb site, along
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with the biographies of the officials in charge of the TIA project. The IAO then proceeded to
rename the TIA system as "Terrorist Information System", hoping to generate support from US
citizens'
post-September 11, 2001 terrorist fears.
The initiatives under development as part of the TIA program cover all aspects ofprivacy
invasion. For example, researcher Teresa Lunt is developing a privacy appliance under the
Project Genisys branch on the TIA program (Fordahl 5E). The device would give the owner of a
data warehouse control over data sharing specifics in response to a request for data. When the
device receives a request for information fitting a set of criteria, it returns the records for all of
the individuals in the warehouse that meet the criteria, but not before filtering out any personally
identifying information. Investigators could use subsequent queries to narrow down the number
of individuals in the pool to a smaller number, at which point they would be required to secure a
warrant before receiving the
individuals'
identification. As with most technological innovations,
there are positive and negative aspects to the privacy appliance. According to David Sobel,
"What is the standard the judge is going to be judging this on? We're talking about someone who
might have a proclivity to commit a crime that has not yet been committed. This is just
something that is completely alien to our judicial
system"
(qtd. in Fordhal 5E). Without proper
oversight and auditing, there is no way to stop an investigative agency from manipulating queries
to obtain the results they desire. Investigators could easily construct a set of queries to return all
male, Islamic, Middle Eastern individuals that are flying on an airline in the next month,
convince a judge that they are suspected as part of some fabricated plot, and imprison them
indefinitely.
Even the device's designer does not understand its full potential. According to Fordahl,
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"She [Lunt] admits that she is not fully aware of all the government's plans. But as she
understands it, government analysts won't be fishing through data swept into a central
database. Rather, they will first create models of suspicious activities, and then query
privately controlled databases protected by privacy appliances to find out numbers-but
not identities-ofpeople matching certain
traits"
(5E).
Lunt completely misunderstands the situation on a number ofpoints. First, the article previously
stated that law enforcement officials could gain permission to identify individuals by obtaining a
warrant from a judge. After all, it would not have been very useful to know before the Sept. 11,
2001 WTC tragedies that an unknown number of unidentified individuals might be planning a
terrorist attack. Second, having access to multiple private databases is the same as having access
to one centralized database. Manually performing queries to multiple tables in multiple databases
is analogous to performing a SEQUEL join on the tables or having all of the information in one
database. This is the basic definition of the panoptic sort. Third, there is no one to provide
oversight of the operations or control data management. We know that the government desires to
create one large centralized database containing the panoptic information describing every
resident of the US. There is no one to prevent law enforcement officials from reusing the data
regarding a group ofpotential suspects in their own centralized database. Once law enforcement
officials obtain a warrant to identify the potential suspects, they could hand the data over to the
DoD for entry into the main TIA database. Regardless, the development of the privacy appliance
proves that the USG plans to execute a panoptic sort on "suspected terrorists". It is frightening to
consider that the USG possesses these capabilities.
These facts raise additional questions regarding the two previously mentioned persistent
digital nym platforms. The government may decide against maintaining a large centralized data
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warehouse, if they can rely onMicrosoft and the Liberty Alliance to maintain a database for
them. According to Larry Diffey, "This, of course, makes it that much easier for the government,
under the guise of the Patriot Act, to procure this information. What would prevent the
government from keeping constant tabs on all Passport usage in the interest ofnational
security?"
(40).
In an attempt to display their dismay at the government's new operations, individual
citizens and citizen groups have bought and displayed the personal information of selected
government officials. According to Jennifer C. Kerr, "The California-based Foundation for
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights said for $26 each it was able to purchase the Social Security
numbers and home addresses for Tenet, Ashcroft, and other top Bush administration officials,
including Karl Rove, the president's chief political
advisor"
("Privacy advocates"). The specific
reason for this action (beyond proving the insecurity ofpersonal information) was to protest
House legislation intended on protecting consumer rights. According to Kerr, "While backing the
overall goals of the bill, the group's executive director, Jamie Court, objected to a portion of it
that would continue a current pre-emption of tougher state privacy
laws"
("Privacy advocates").
The group's main concern was that the law did not regulate large conglomerate corporations that
fail to monitor their inter-organizational information sharing. According to Kerr, "For example, a
banking corporation might have a number of insurance, securities and real estate affiliates it does
business with and financial data might be swapped among
all"
("Privacy advocates").
Other attacks on the TIA system have directly targeted Admiral John Poindexter (Ret.),
after a suggestion in Matt Smith's column for
"sfweekly.com"
that the government should learn
first-hand the dangers of the TIA system. In his article, Smith published personal information
regarding Poindexter, including his home phone number, address, wife's name and information
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about her religious convictions. There was an instant response to Smith's column: The
"cryptome eyeball
series"
(http://cryptome.org/eyeball.htm) contains high-resolution satellite
photos ofUS government and military installations. The "Eyeballing Total Information
Awareness"
page (http://cryptome.org/tia-eyeball.htm) provides Poindexter's name, address,
telephone number, satellite photos ofhis house and directions to his house. Another Web site
(http://fyre.sytes.net:8007/pictures.html) contains pictures ofPoindexter's house taken from the
street out-front. This information resulted in the
Poindexters'
receiving an unrelenting stream of
telephone calls to their residence, complaining about the TIA system.
On July 17, 2003, the US Senate voted unanimously to cut funding for the TIA system.
The final Congressional budget officially terminated the TIA system, and appears to have
disbanded the IAO (the Office's Web site no longer exists). Given the overly secretive history of
the USG, it is imperative that privacy organizations continue to pay close attention to the
government's actions. The government has already shown it willingness to monitor citizens with
the Carnivore
system.13
The Area 51 research facility has long been a secret among secrets,
proven to exist only through satellite photos and warning signs that dot its far perimeter. Some
secrets, such as the (formerly) secret underground city at Green Briar, are necessary for our
13
The Carnivore program is part of a suite ofprograms known as the "DragonWare Suite". The FBI utilizes the
DragonWare suite to track "suspected criminals". This suite ofprograms captures packets, reassembles them, and
facilitates data mining operations on the recovered data. FBI agents install a computer with the DragonWare Suite at
an ISP, and begin capturing data. One problem with the system is that the FBI has not yet developed a way for it to
capture only data relating to the suspected criminal. In fact, this seems to be an interesting wordplay on the name
"Carnivore". A carnivorous dinosaur eats any type ofmeat without being selective or choosy. The Carnivore portion
of the suite captures and analyzes all traffic from all users without being selective or choosy. Other fears include
corrupt officials who use the DragonWare Suite to spy on innocent individuals. Compoundmg the problems is that
under the USA PATRIOT ACT the FBI no longer has to obtain a warrant to use the DragonWare Suite. Some ISPs,
including AOL (America Online) and Earthlink, have publicly refused to allow the FBI to bring a computer with
DragonWare Suite installed into their facilities, even with a court order. In the end, the FBI used Carnivore only 25
times, between 1998 and 2000 (AP "FBI abandons"). The total cost of the failed Carnivore project was between $6
million and $15 million (AP "FBI abandons"). On January 18, 2005, the FBI announced that it was canceling the
project in favor ofusing commercial software instead (AP "FBI abandons").
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national safety. However, we must continually strive to uncover secrets that threaten the privacy,
sanity, or basic human condition of the country's residents.
Ultimately, the status of programs such as the TIA may prove irrelevant, as we come
closer to realizing the fullest potential of the NIL In the TIA program the government desired a
centralized location to gather, store, and mine
individuals'
panoptic information. Even without a
centralized data store, as the Nil develops and the information about each human being stored at
various locations grows, the government will still be able to access all of the information using a
panoptic sort.
Other Programs
It appears that the fight for information privacy may never end, as the end of one program
only signals the start of another. Congress may have stopped the TIA system, but that was a
federal program. State-level programs do not fall under the direct influence ofCongress, unless a
law specifically prohibits any form of a program at any level, and state-level programs are
appearing that are every bit as dangerous as the TIA system. According to Robert O'Harrow Jr.,
"Police in Florida are creating a counterterrorism database designed to give law
enforcement agencies around the country a powerful new tool to analyze billions of
records about both criminal and ordinary Americans. Organizers said the system, dubbed
Matrix, enables investigators to find patterns and links among people and events faster
than ever before, combining police records with commercially available collections of
personal information about most American adults. It would let authorities, for instance,
instantly find the name and address of every brown-haired owner of a red Ford pickup




According to O'Harrow Jr., "The Justice Department has provided $4 million to expand
theMatrix program nationally and will provide the computer network for information sharing
among the states. . .At least a dozen states
-
including Pennsylvania, New York, andMichigan
-
said they want to add their records ("U.S. Backs"). Even those connected to the project fear its
power. According to O'Harrow Jr., "A senior official acknowledged it could be intrusive and
pledged to use it with restraint. 'It's scary. It could be abused. I mean, I can call up everything
about you, your pictures and pictures of your
neighbors,'
said Phil Ramer, special agent in




Government Information in Public View
While attempting to gather all of the US
residents'
panoptic information, the USG has
failed to secure its own information, as illustrated by Sean Gorman, a graduate student at GMU
(George Mason University). Gorman created a computerized map of the US, detailing its entire
fiber optic infrastructure (Laura Blumenfeld "Dissertation could"). According to Blumenfeld,
"He can click on a bank inManhattan and see who has communication lines running into
it and where. He can zoom in on Baltimore and find the choke point for trucking
warehouses. He can drill into a cable trench between Kansas and Colorado and determine
how to create the most havoc with a hedge
clipper"
("Dissertation could").
Gorman's project, like many other research projects in the post-September 11, 2001 world, is
coming under scrutiny from the
government and law enforcement officials for the threat that it
poses to national security. As with standard government operating procedures, they treat Gorman
as the criminal, even though he gathered all of the information for his project from public
sources, in print and on the Internet.
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Gorman's project did not interest anyone until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. Officials then realized that his project had created an interactive map that terrorists could
use to cripple the nation's critical infrastructure. According to Blumenfeld, "Every fiber, thin an
a hair, carries the impulses responsible for Internet traffic, telephones, cell phones, military
communications, bank transfers, air traffic control, signals to the power grids and water systems,
among other
things"
("Dissertation could"). At one end of the spectrum, a split in a fiber optic
line could render a city without Internet access for days, a situation this
thesis'
author
experienced first-hand. At the other end of the spectrum, a split to the correct fiber backbone
could render an entire region without electricity, water or other critical resources.
Gorman and his research partner now work on their project under strict security
guidelines imposed by GMU. According to Blumenfeld, ". . .[the project is] sitting in a gray
cinderblock lab secured by an electronic lock, multiple sign-on codes, and a paper
shredder. . .When their computer crashed, they removed the hard drive, froze it, smashed it and
rubbed magnets over the surface to erase the
data"
("Dissertation could"). Imposing these strict
security guidelines may have been the only way for GMU to allow the project to continue, given
the intense pressure from businesses and the government for them to terminate and destroy the
project. Unfortunately, the government chose to intimidate an innocent student, rather than focus
on removing potentially dangerous information from publicly available resources.
Cameras on Every Corner
In modern society, we should assume that we cannot escape Big Brother's gaze, because
that appears to be the unfortunate truth. Consider the case ofDavid Horton, whom police
arrested at a Cincinnati Reds professional baseball game, after his face appeared in a crowd shot
on the 'Kiss
Cam'
(MSNBC "Wanted man"). Coincidentally, his parole officer was also at the
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game, and recognized Horton on the video screen (MSNBC "Wanted man"). Department stores
have long used cameras hidden in the eyes ofmannequins as video surveillance to catch
shoplifters. In this case, security is only concerned with preventing shoplifting. WTiat happens
when the government decides to watch everyone? What happens when the goal is not to watch
for specific actions, but to watch and record all actions, as is the goal of the HumanLD (Human
Identification at a Distance) program?
The IAO originall developed the HumanLD program as part of the TIA program.




automated biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize and
identify humans at great distances. These technologies will provide critical early warning
support for force protection and homeland defense against terrorist, criminal, and other
human-based threats, and will prevent or decrease the success rate of such attacks against
DoD operational facilities and installations. Methods for fusing biometric technologies
into advanced human identification systems will be developed to enable faster, more
accurate and unconstrained identification ofhumans at significant standoff distances".
In short, the goal of the program is to be able to recognize any human being from a distance of
500 feet away, using their facial features, retinal scans and gait characteristics as identifiers. In
order for this technology to work, the government must have access to information regarding an
individual's facial, retinal and gait patterns, which adds to the evidence supporting the
government's desire to create one central database as part of the now-defunct TIA program.
According to the former IAO Web site, one of the plans for the system in the 2004 calendar year
is to "Fuse face and gait recognition into a 24/7 human identification system". The evidence is
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astoundingly clear that the government plans to monitor every individual in this country to
"prevent crime", or more likely, to control society.
In order for the HumanID program to be effective, the government must place networked
cameras in public places. The cameras would send face scans of individuals to a computer that
can analyze and display them for a human investigator. The government could require stores that
use hidden cameras to provide them with access to the video, so that they might add it to their
data warehouse.
The government secretly tested facial recognition systems during the 2001 Super Bowl in
Tampa Bay, Florida. Hidden cameras secretly scanned the face of every individual that entered
the stadium that day, in an attempt to determine if they posed a threat to security (Robert Trigaux
"Cameras scanned"). According to Trigaux, "In milliseconds, each facial image was digitized
and checked electronically against computer files ofknown criminals, terrorists and con artists of
the Tampa Police Department, the FBI and other state and local law enforcement
agencies"
("Cameras scanned"). The experiment was only mildly successful. "It turns out that facial-scan
technology works best when it's used to confirm whether people are who they say they are.
Picking a crook out of a cast of thousands is a lot harder, and false alarms are more
common"
(RandyDotinga "Biometrics Benched"). False alarms are not desirable when the question
revolves around possibly detaining an individual, and the system must be highly accurate and
reliable. There were some successes though, "Afterward Tampa Bay police reported that the
technology pinpointed 19 people with criminal records out of a crowd of
100,000"
(Dotinga
"Biometrics Benched"). Notice that the system found individuals with criminal records, not
necessarily individuals wanted for questioning or that posed a potential threat. Since law
enforcement chose not to detain any of those individuals, their record must not have seemed
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threatening. This leads us to the problems ofjumping to conclusions and allowing individuals to
overcome their past mstakes. Many people have criminal records, often for things done
carelessly in their younger years. People make mistakes, and it is important to be able to put
those mistakes in the past and move on. Perhaps the officer viewing the biometric scans and
personal data is the individual's neighbor, and did not know about his neighbor's past errors.
Now something that should be private and confidential has the opportunity to spread through
gossip.
Another place where cameras have become prevalent is retail stores. For a short time, the
emphasis on placing cameras in a store was to hide them from a potential shoplifter's view.
Hidden cameras that caught shoplifters required stores to spend time and resources dealing with
the prosecution of the shoplifters. For this reason, the emphasis has switched to cameras that are
in plain sight. Many stores place signs near the store entrance, warning of camera usage. This
strategy greatly deters shoplifting attempts and saves money for the stores. This approach might
seem ideal, because the warning sign allows a potential shopper to decide if they want to shop in
a store that films innocent shoppers. Not only are shoppers recorded, but in many stores they are
recorded everywhere they wander.
If the paranoia over the presence of cameras seems unfounded, then one only needs to
examine Britain, where cameras record the public on a daily basis. According to Jane Black,
"Britain has 4,500 speed cams. The country's more than 2.5 million CCTV [closed-circuit
television] cameras catch each British resident as many as 300 times each
day"
("Smile,
you're"). The cameras, used to catch speeding motorists and record minor traffic violations, have
angered British citizens to the point where vandalism aimed at destroying the cameras occurs
weekly (Black "Smile, you're"). The delicate balance
between law enforcement and obtrusive
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monitoring falls out of consideration when the law enforcement method does not work.
According to Black,
"And yet, very little evidence shows that speed cams reduce road deaths or that CCTV
deters crime. .
.Instead,
there's an overwhelming feeling that too often surveillance is used
not to make the country safer but to monitor innocent people and, in the case of speed
cams, raise much-needed tax
revenues"
("Smile, you're").
Statistics support the notion that the cameras only increase revenue without saving lives or
preventing crimes that are more serious. According to Black,
"From 1995 to 2001 (the latest figure available), the number of speed-cam tickets and
prosecutions in Britain soared from around 207,000 to more than 1 million, while road
deaths increased 4.5 percent, from 2,995 to 3,127. . .it's clear CCTV has done little to
clean up the streets. Study after study shows that CCTV simply displaces crime to areas
where no cameras are present rather than preventing it. According to a June, 2002, report
from crime-fighting nonprofit NACRO, CCTV cuts crime only by 5%, vs. 20% reduction
achieved by brighter street
lighting"
("Smile, you're").
The study revealed a shocking truth: Rather than spending tax dollar buying cameras and spying
on residents, the government could have reduced crime by installing a few more street lamps.
As with the USG, the British government could not stop with simply monitoring traffic
violations. According to Black,
"Then, on Feb. 8 just a month after its introduction London newspaper The
Observer revealed that the system was organized in cooperation with the intelligence
services, which were using facial-recognition technology to monitor individual drivers.
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Suspicious motorists would be monitored not just at the point of entry but around the
city"
("Smile, you're").
Monitoring devices could also start turning up in the most unlikely ofplaces, as proven
by a recent CIA exhibit chronicling the organization's history. According to the Reuters story,
"The CIA once built a mechanical dragonfly to carry a listening device but found small gusts of
wind knocked it off course so it was never used in a spy operation. The Agency also tested a
24-
inch-long rubber robot catfish named
"Charlie"
capable of swimming inconspicuously among
other fish and whose mission remains
secret"
("CIA displays"). It is important to note that when
the CIA developed the dragonfly in the 1970's, the organization at that time possessed the
capabilities to create a miniature listening device and flying machine. One can only guess at how
much the CIA might have developed and advanced its technology since then. Given the size of
miniature spy cameras available from retail "spy stores", it is probably safe to assume that today
the CIA can mount a camera on a mechanical dragonfly without worrying about gusts ofwind.
Even today's consumer recording devices excel at recording localized conversations. Modern
digital voice recorders available for purchase are as small as 4 inches long, 1 inch wide and V2 an
inch deep, and make excellent recordings, even when hidden under clothing.
In response to the growing number of surveillance cameras in Washington D.C., EPIC
has lunched its "Observing
Surveillance"
campaign
(http.7/www.observingsurveillance.org./), aimed at raising
citizens'
awareness of government spy
cameras. The purpose of the Observing Surveillance program is to cut through the rhetoric and
let the evidence speak for itself: Individuals photograph cameras aroundWashington D.C.
(District ofColumbia), and provide EPIC with the photograph along with a description of the
camera's location. Only through cataloging the extent to which cameras are used can we begin to
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stand against them. EPIC maintains a large repository of information regarding worldwide
surveillance at http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/. Amazingly, law enforcement erected
the cameras inWashington D.C. without a supporting policy to govern their usage (Matha
Teichner "CloseWatch"). Washington D.C. is not the only place where cameras are prevalent.
According to Teichner, "Every Sunday, Bill Brown conducts walking tours of the surveillance
cameras in Times Square as many as 200 of them, by his count, out of the 5,000 he has
mapped in New York City as a
whole"
("Close Watch"). EarthCam (http://www.earthcam.com),
aWeb site that provides linkups to cameras in various locations around the world, provides a
small glimpse at how many cameras are in operation worldwide (Teichner "Close Watch").
Using EarthCam you can look through cameras around the world. Remember that EarthCam
shows only a small fraction of the cameras that are in existence and photographing unaware
citizens.
Law enforcement officials would have us believe that they do not possess the advanced
capabilities necessary to perform accurate facial recognition and track individuals walking the
streets. This is not true, and an inexpensive camera purchased from any technology store has
these capabilities. Worse, satellite imagery is advancing at startling rates. In 1959, the US
launched the Corona satellites, which had a resolution of 5 feet (Garfinkel 96). From space, the
satellites could view any object on earth that was at lease 5 feet across. In 1996, Space Imaging
launched a satellite with a resolution of 1 meter, or approximately 3 feet (Garfinkel 100). Many
experts believe that current spy satellites can resolve the text on the side of a cigarette package.
Even non-intelligence satellites provide advanced viewing capabilities. The following
photograph is of a street in Rochester, New York, taken by the USGS (United States
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Geographical Survey) on April 22, 1994, and retrieved on April 30, 2004 from TerraServer USA
(http://terraserver.microsoft.com):
In 1994, one decade ago, the details of streets and buildings are clear. The following image,
taken on July 26, 2000, and retrieved from GeoXplorer Image Atlas






This image clearly displays cars, parking spaces, sidewalks and other objects in color to an
amazing level of detail. The capability ofmodern satellites is startling and slightly unnerving.
According to Garfinkel, "Whether you are on top ofMount Everest, floating on a raft in the
middle of the Pacific, burying the victims of a massacre, or simply building an unauthorized pool
in your backyard, today you can be absolutely alone and yet have the eyes of the world upon
you"
(104). Adding to the threat is the revelation that Google, a leader in technological
revolutions, plans to create its own free mapping service, greatly increasing the availability and
quality of satellite photographs.
The US is not the only country with questionable satellite practices. According to the
Yahoo! India News coverage of a story reported by Reuters, "China plans to launch more than
100 satellites before 2020 to watch every corner of the country, state-run China Central
Television quoted a government official as saying on
Tuesday"
("China plans"). Officials stated
that the satellites would monitor events occurring in nature and map the country's geography, as
well as monitoring the activities of society, although officials would not elaborate further on the
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last point (Reuters "China plans"). At least the Chinese government made its plans somewhat
public. According to Dana Priest,
"The United States is building a new generation of spy satellites designed to orbit
undetected, in a highly classified program that has provoked opposition in closed
congressional sessions where lawmakers have questioned its necessity and rapidly
escalating price, according to U.S.
officials"
(A01).
Although no legislator publicly admitted that the program exists, information about it has
become public as a result of the intensity of the debates taking place behind closed doors, most
ofwhich centers around the program's price tag that is skyrocketing towards $9 billion dollars
(Priest A01).
NASA's Mind Reading Experiments: Pre-crime in the PhysicalWorld
As mentioned in the introduction, Orwell's novel
"1984"
introduced the world to the
"Thought Police", who could read minds and determine if an individual was thinking any
thoughts that were contrary to the beliefs espoused by Big Brother. In "Minority Report", the
Pre-Crime division of the police force utilizes the abilities of three special humans to predict the
future to prevent crimes before they happen. These may seem like outrageous concepts, but some
government officials believe they are worth a second look. In August 2002, it was revealed that
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) was considering technology that would
allow airport security to "read the
minds"
ofboarding passengers, in an attempt to prevent acts of
terrorism. According to Frank J. Murray, "Officials of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration have told Northwest Airlines security specialists that the agency is developing
brain-monitoring devices in cooperation with a commercial firm, which it did not
identify"
(A01). Interestingly, this was not the first attempt at mind reading for the purpose of data
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gathering and crime prevention. The US Military conducted numerous experiments during the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s to develop mind reading capabilities (Garfinkel 234). One team
reportedly discovered at least seven people that could reliably describe the thoughts and actions
ofpeople at a great distance (Garfinkel 234). The difference with the modern program is that it
attempts to utilize science rather than psychic abilities.
In NASA's system, airports would mount devices designed to monitor the brain waves
and heartbeat patterns ofpassengers into airport screening devices (Murray A01). IfNASA is
able to perfect this technology, then walking through a metal detector might subject an individual
to more than just a scan formetallic objects. It might also subject an individual to a more
encompassing scan, one that would take into account the individual's panoptic information.
According to Murray, "Computers would apply statistical algorithms to correlate physiologic
patterns with computerized data on travel routines, criminal background and credit information





Currently, NASA is not attempting to examine and decode actual thoughts, but rather
search for biological patterns that match ones considered consistent with criminals in the
moments before they commit a crime. According to RickMathieson, "In fact, the technology
might one day be able to identify nuero-electric patterns associated with the way the brain
functions when a person is planning to commit a
crime"
("brain storm"). Specialists would
analyze the biological information along with other personal information regarding the
individual, to determine if the person is about to commit an act of terrorism. This is similar to the
methods employed by a profiler or investigator, only the amount of information analyzed is
much more extensive and very private, and the search is more intrusive. Personal actions that
might signal a potential terrorist are a one-way plane ticket, changes in grocery shopping patterns
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and changes in spending patterns. Biological signs would include accelerated heart rate, emission
of specific brain wave patterns and certain signals conveyed by the eyes. According to
Mathieson, "The idea is to quickly render a complete picture of an individual traveler and then
run algorithms to assess the threat
risk"
("brain storm").
NASA is developing the mind-reading technology as part of its role in developing
improvements to the CAPPS (Computer-Aided Passenger Pre-Screening) system currently
employed by airports. The September 11, 2001 hijackers used dry runs to test the current CAPPS
system's ability to identify potential hijackers as threatening (Murray A01). According to
Mathieson, "Presently, the CAPPS system collects and stores basic travel information - whether
you bought your ticket with cash or credit card, whether you're a frequent flier, and when was
the last time you
flew"
("brain storm"). Many organizations are looking at ways to improve the
CAPPS system, to improve
airports'
ability to prevent passenger related problems. The new
system (tentatively named CAPPS II and discussed in the next section) could contain many
improvements, including NASA's mind-reading technology.
The "mind
reading"
portion of the technology is actually relatively simple, and is based
upon techniques presently available to medical professionals. According to Murray,
"He [Herb Schlickenmaier, the NASA researcher who made the presentation to
Northwest Airlines] likened the proposal to a super lie detector that would also measure
pulse rate, body temperature, eye-flicker rate and other biometric aspects sensed
remotely. . .he confirms that NASA has a goal ofmeasuring brain waves and heartbeat
rates of airline passengers as they pass screening
machines"
(A01).
In order to be effective, the scanners would need to use fMRL (functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging) to get a clear picture of the brain's current activity (Mathieson "brain storm"). In the
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closing months of 2004, scientists proved that the brain looks much different in an individual
who is lying, and displays a higher rate of activity (Reuters "Brain scans"). According to the
Reuters story,
"Lying caused activity in the frontal part of the brain the medial inferior and
pre-
central areas, as well as the hippocampus and middle temporal regions and the limbic
areas. Some of these are involved in emotional responses, Faro said. During a truthful




The problem exists with performing the scans wirelessly and quickly (Mathieson "brain storm").
Current fMRI scanners are large and require an unacceptable amount of time for even the
simplest scans of any body parts.
In addition, problems exist in identifying foolproofpatterns that will not generate any
false positives or false negatives. Thus far, scientists have not determined what signals the brain
generates before committing a crime. An individual who just had an argument with their spouse,
one who is feeling guilty over some minor act, who is having a bad day or thinking about how
much they hate their boss, could emit brainwave patterns similar to those of a criminal about to
commit a crime. It will require very careful analysis to determine brain patterns and background
patterns that can absolutely prove that someone is about to commit a terrorist act.
NASA is invading the privacy of individuals before the system is even in place.
According to Murray, "NASA also requested that the airline turn over all of its computerized





to analyze such data, biometric facial
recognition, and 'neuro-electric
sensing'"
(A01). Northwest Airlines cooperated in turning the
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data over to NASA, and anyone who flew in the months prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks
could have had much of their personal information analyzed as part of the process ofdeveloping
different behavioral models. It is possible that the government could use the personal information
as the starting point for a centralized database. According to Mathieson, "The concept may be
part of the Bush Administration's plans for a 'Total Information
Awareness'
system, a global
electronic dragnet designed to use data mining to look for threatening patterns in everyday
transactions and information - your credit card purchases, student report cards, mental health
records, and more
- that is reported to roll out in
2007"
("brain storm").
This program further proves the government's quest for a centralized database of a
perfected panoptic sort. IfNASA plans to analyze biological information gathered in real-time at
an airport with other pertinent personal information regarding an individual, then they must have
access to the additional information.
CAPPS II
As mentioned in the previous section, the CAPPS II system seeks to correct problems in
the original CAPPS system that allowed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to occur.
Putting aside NASA's mind reading experiments, the readily available features ofCAPPS II
mean that individuals booking a flight will expose their personal information to a greater degree
than ever before.
The controversy surrounding the system first appeared when the government announced
that when an individual booked a flight, the system would use public records to color-code the
potential airline passenger as green, yellow or red. A
"green"
rating enables a potential passenger
to fly without any extra measures; a
"yellow"
rating signals that a potential passenger will
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receive additional checks at the airport; a
"red"
rating prevents the potential
passenger from
flying. According to Brock N. Meeks,
"The new system, the cost ofwhich isn't known but will be borne entirely by the federal
government instead of the airlines, will take a traveler's personal information name,
address, date-of-birth and telephone number and feed it into commercial databases and
police records, the latter looking only for instances of violent
crimes"
("TSA Defends").
After the commercial database check, the system would check the potential passenger's




to 8 percent ofpassengers who board the nation's 26,000 daily flights will be
coded
"yellow"
and will undergo additional screening at the checkpoint, according to
people familiarwith the program. An estimated 1 to 2 percent will receive the
"red"
label,




Although the USG hoped to implement the new system by summer of2004, opposition
from the ACLU and the major airlines has slowed the system's progress. First, Delta Airlines,
which was supposed to assist the government in testing the system, backed out in response to
criticism and threats of a boycott from the traveling public (Goo, "Fliers
to"
A01). Next, the
ACLU brought forth a lawsuit against the TSA (Transportation Safety Authority) to prevent the
system's implementation. One of the ACLU's main complaints was that the system would create
too many false positives, stripping
innocent individuals of their basic right to travel freely. The
system would not inform potential passengers of their color rating or allow them to view the
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information used to determine their status, making it impossible for individuals to correct errors
in their information and categorization.
The situation worsened upon the discovery that three of the major airlines (Northwest,
American Airlines and JetBlue) had shared passenger information with the USG without
passengers'
consent. The fallout from the breaches was great, causing airline companies to
change their privacy policies and practices to inform passengers ofpotential data sharing.
According to Goo, "Major U.S. carriers are scrambling to create disclosure policies that inform
customers theymight share personal data with the federal government, in response to two highly




E01). While the legality of data sharing is questionable, consumer reaction was
sharply negative. According to Goo,
"Legal experts said there are no laws against companies sharing information with the
government or other companies. But companies that do not disclose under what
conditions they share the information and who gets it could face suits from consumers for
deception and breach of privacy. They could also face fines or investigations by





Now, the FBI is holding onto the information gained from the airlines, refusing to share it or
release it. According to an AP report, "The bureau is keeping 257.5 million records on people
who flew on commercial airlines from June through September 2001 in its permanent
investigative database, according to information obtained by a privacy group and made available
to The Associated
Press"
("FBI holds"). The story continues,
"The data are called passenger name records, or PNR, and can include a variety of
information such as credit card numbers, travel itineraries, addresses, telephone numbers
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and meal requests. David Hardy, the FBI's chiefof the record/information dissemination
section of the records management division, said in a legal document dated Jan. 5 that the




This provides additional proof that the USG is attempting to construct a large, centralized data
warehouse for the purpose of any number ofprivacy invading projects.
Despite new attempts at securing air travel, the system is still vulnerable to
unsophisticated, low-tech attacks. In September 2003, an individual packaged himself in a
shipping crate, registered it as containing computer equipment and was flown cargo-class from
New York to Dallas (Koeing "Shipping clerk"). In February 2004, a man strolled past two
security checkpoints and onto a jumbo jet without a ticket at Las Angeles International Airport
during a period of time when the nation was on high alert (MSNBC "Brazen intruder").
In April 2004, the ACLU announced a lawsuit against the TSA for the CAPPS II system,
nicknamed by the media as the "no-fly list". The ACLU is representing a number ofpassengers
who believe that the system improperly subjected them to additional questioning or caused the
denial of their flight privileges. One individual, DavidNelson, believes that his case is one of
mistaken identity, and the government should be looking for another David Nelson (WJLA
"ACLU sues"). Due to the level ofoutcry from citizens and activist groups, on July 15, 2004 the
TSA announced that it had cancelled the CAPPS II program.
Smart Stamps
The USPS (United States Postal Service), losing money for years due to the growing
popularity of eMail and instant messaging,
is looking for a way to increase revenues without
continuously raising the price
of stamps. Unfortunately, part of their plan involves stamps
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embedded with tracking devices that would allow the USPS to track a particular stamp's
movement throughout the postal system.
According to Alorie Gilbert, "Thought details remain sketchy, an intelligent mail system
would involve using barcodes or special stamps, identifying, at a minimum, the sender, the
destination, and the class ofmail. . .It [the report suggesting the changes] also suggests USPS
work with the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security to develop the
system"
("Postal LD").
The smart stamp plan has many opportunities for abuse. The USPS claims that one of the
biggest uses of smart stamps would be to track communication between individuals, in order to
link them to one another. Of course, the USPS wants everyone to believe that those individuals
would be under surveillance for a legitimate purpose (suspected terrorists). Perhaps earlier
implementation of a smart stamp system would have enabled authorities to capture the
Unabomber or the individual responsible for the anthrax-tainted mailings after September 11,
2001. The problem is that we have no way of limiting ormonitoring the government's usage of
smart stamps. Nor do we know what personal information the USPS will connect to each stamp.
If the USPS can use the smart stamps to monitor communications between suspected
criminals, then what would prevent the government from monitoring each letter that every
individual ever sends? The information could be stored along with all of our other panoptic
information, ready for use or sale. After all, the USPS has a history of information sale and
misuse. According to Garfinkel, ". . .the National Change ofAddress Program [used for mail
forwarding when an individual moves] is actually run by the same companies that send tens of
billions ofpieces ofjunk mail each year to hundreds ofmillions ofAmerican
consumers"
(157).
Garfinkel explains, "When you fill out a change of address card, the card is sent to a processing




(164). The problem is that once the data is in the hands of those firms, it
is nearly impossible to assure proper use. According to Miller, "Most direct merchants generate
subsidiary income from selling the names in their database to other companies. . (309).
Whether your name gets to marketers through sale or through the National Change ofAddress
Program, the result is usually the same: Uncontrolled sale and misuse of your personal
information.
FBI's DNA Databank
The FBI plans to make a collection ofblood samples of all federal inmates and parolees.
Minimally, the FBI desires samples from criminals convicted ofviolent crimes, mainly rape. Of
course, state and federal law enforcement agencies will not stop with just sex offenders.
According to Garfinkel, "Some states require that all convicted violent criminals provide
samples. Others require that people convicted on nonviolent crimes be genetically fingerprinted
as well. Some states even collect and databank the genetic patterns from people accused of
crimes"
(53). Under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 [Public Law 106-546],
federal inmates and parolees were required to provide blood samples for the FBI's collection.
The FBI cataloged the samples, added them to the collection and made the collection available to
law enforcement agencies across the nation. Thankfully, the Court ofAppeals determined that
the blood sampling procedures were unconstitutional. According to David Kravets, "The 9th
U.S. Circuit Court ofAppeals ruled that requiring the blood samples was illegal because they are
taken without legal suspicion that the convicts were involved in other
crimes"
("Federal
appeals"). According to Kravets, "Knox [Monica Knox, a deputy public defender ofLos
Angeles] said the government has extracted blood from thousands of federal inmates and former
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prisoners on supervised release. She said the decision, if it survives appeal, could also nullify
state laws that require the taking ofblood from
inmates"
("Federal appeals").
It is fascinating to witness the government and law enforcement repeatedly attempt to
stretch technology and public policy to fit their current needs. The DNA databank was probably
illegal and somewhat evasive when it only involved criminals convicted ofviolent crimes. Then
they decided to apply it to those convicted of non-violent crimes and those only accused of
crimes. This is the "mission
creep"
scenario that concerns experts every time the USG passes a
new law or adopts a new technology.
US VISIT
The US VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology)
program seeks to identify individuals entering the US from another country. While there is a
valid argument for such a program, the extent to which US VISIT identifies and monitors
individuals is an invasion of their privacy.
According to Fisher,
"As part of the process, foreigners arriving at US-VISIT-capable airports and seaports
have each of their index fingers scanned and a digital photo of their faces taken. This data
is stored in a database, along with the person's visa number, and compared against so-
called watch lists ofknown terrorists and criminals. Each time the person enters the
country, another database search is done to see if any new information about the visitor
has accumulated since his or her last
visit"
("New DHS").
Visitors will also be checked when they leave the country, to verify that they obeyed the policies
of their visa (MSNBC "Airports to"). Reports estimate that the program will check 24 million
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visitors per year (MSNBC "Airports to"). By the end of 2004, the USG hopes to have the
program available at 50 land crossings along the US border (MSNBC "Airports to").
Privacy Protection Laws
A thorough and proper examination of the legal landscape must include privacy
protection laws. Unfortunately, many of the privacy protection laws are relatively new, and have
not generated the publicity of the laws that invade privacy. In addition, the USG is not nearly as
concerned with enforcing laws protecting privacy as it is with enforcing invasive laws. For these
reasons, it is difficult to examine the results and possible success of these laws. The following
paragraphs examine each law and the available results thus far.
The goal ofFCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act; 15 USC 1681) was to provide consumers
with the tools necessary to gain knowledge of their credit information, and to protect their
information from improper sale or use. Unfortunately, enforcement ofFCRA is loose and the
penalties are weak. Credit bureaus regularly ignore
consumers'
complaints regarding incorrect
information in their credit file. Some experts attribute the growing threat from identity theft to
creditors'
and bureaus emphasis on selling credit protection products and services rather than
altering their own processes to prevent identity theft from occurring. Enforcing the guidelines put
forth by the FCRA would reduce the threat from identity theft. We need a greater sense of
responsibility and accountability from financial institutions and credit bureaus to provide proper
backing for the law. If a consumer has a justifiable complaint regarding their credit file, all credit
bureaus should have to take notice and correct the error or face legal consequences.
Unfortunately, Michael E. Staten and Fred H. Cate (2004) discovered that experts cannot agree
on the definition of an "accurate credit report", or whether the current credit reporting system
properly represents consumers. Garfinkel claims that the only way to properly enforce privacy
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laws, especially the FCRA, is through stiff financial penalties against all organizations that
misuse information ("Database Nation").
The goal ofFERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act; 20 USC 1232g) was
to protect
students'
rights and the privacy of their personal and academic information. To this
date, there has been minimal compliance with FERPA, mainly due to a lack of enforcement and
understanding. Matt Rose and Dhazi Yang (2004) found that many educators cannot readily
identify the type of student information to which FERPA applies, especially in regard to
computer usage. A study ofFERPA at various educational institutions, including Stanford and
MIT (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology), found that many higher education institutions are
not vigorously following FERPA's guidelines (Anonymous "A study"). In addition, many
institutions do not have clauses in their Privacy Policy to protect
students'
information and
institutions that do have privacy protection statements in their Privacy Policy often violate those
statements in their practices (Anonymous "A study").
Unfortunately, the Pentagon is one of the worst violators of the rules enacted by FERPA.
According to Robert L. Flanigan, "To boost recruitment numbers in a time ofwar, the Pentagon
is working with a private marketing firm to help compile a database ofpotential recruits as
young as 16 using Social Security numbers, e-mail addresses, grade-point averages, ethnicity
and other personal
information"
("Military culls"). The military admits to striving towards the
goal of creating a "centralized
database"
maintained by the DoD, which would also include
information retrieved from Department ofMotor Vehicles records (Flanigan "Military culls").
The Pentagon gained the right to gather the information from the NCLB (No Child Left Behind
Act of2001 ; PL 107-1 10), which directly contradicts the provisions set forth by FERPA. Under
NCLB, the Pentagon may collect a student's information, unless their parents or guardian
108
specifically chooses to deny the Pentagon access to their child's information. Fairport School
District, located in Fairport, NY, is one of a handful of districts nationwide that has chosen to
restrict the military's access to student records, at the threat of reduced funding from the
government. Better oversight and enforcement is necessary to guarantee FERPA compliance and
the protection of
students'
information. In addition, Congress must repeal the sections ofNCLB
that enable the Pentagon's data gathering practices.
The goal ofHLPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; Public
Law 104-191) was to protect
patients'
rights concerning their medical records and provide better
oversight and regulation for the health insurance industry. A survey conducted by AHIMA
(American Health Information Management Association) revealed that 70% of respondents had
uncovered privacy issues in their organization after they began following HLPAA's guidelines
(NewsRx.com "Survey"). Like many laws that provide sweeping guidelines regarding privacy,
information management and financial regulation, HLPAA is complex, and many organizations
find compliance difficult. However, if this survey provides any indication of future results, then
HLPAA has been beneficial in protecting personal privacy.
The goal ofCOPA (Children's Online Privacy Protection Act; 15 USC 6501-6506) is to
protect children while they are online. The act was highly controversial and heavily debated from
its very beginning, as many experts felt that it went too far in censoring the content available to
adults. Early on the law suffered numerous defeats and revisions in the court system before
becoming effective. The main benefit ofCOPA was that organizations were required to obtain a
parent or guardian's permission before collecting information from individuals under the age of
13. Unfortunately, enforcement of that policy has been non-existent, and most Web sites
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"comply"
by simply displaying a checkbox that the user checks if they are over the age of 13.
With no way to truly verify the age of the user, the policy is useless.
The goal ofGLB (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999; Public Law 106-102) was to
regulate the manner in which financial institutions collect and share an individual's personal
information. Many privacy advocates have spoken out against GLB because of its numerous
loopholes and inadequate privacy protection clauses. One of the main criticisms ofGLB is that it
requires individuals to opt-out of information sharing, rather than requiring them to opt-in before
organizations share the individual's information (Stephen Brostoff 42). In addition, GLB allows
each state to pass its own laws restricting financial
institutions'
information sharing, potentially
creating a confusing legal landscape of contradicting laws (Brostoff 42). For these reasons,
privacy advocates are calling for a stronger law at the national level to replace GLB.
The goal of Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; H.R. 3763) was to regulate
the operations of all publicly traded companies. The law's creation resulted from the financial
disasters created by the recent slew of accounting scandals, including Enron and WorldCom.
Although not specifically designed to protect individual privacy, the enforcement of SOX has
resulted in better privacy protection, through improved security, process management, training,
document management and increased use of encryption. Unfortunately, few companies are
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley, making it impossible to determine the results of the law's
sections regarding privacy protection and information sharing.
The goal ofCAN-SPAM (Controlling the Assault ofNon-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act of 2003; S.877) was to reduce and prevent the onslaught of spam eMail that
invades most
users'
inbox on a daily basis. Many organizations are now reporting that 75-80% of
14
The law implements a graduated compliance deadline that requires only organizations with the highest level of
annual revenue to comply at the first deadline (June 2004). Organizations in the middle and bottom revenue brackets
have more time to reach compliance. In addition, only publically traded companies must comply with SOX.
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the eMail messages that they receive daily are spam. Individuals are receiving hundreds of spam
eMail messages daily. The threat to privacy from spam is from how the spammers accumulate
eMail addresses, and the dangerous phishing attempts that spam often carries.
Spammers may retrieve eMail messages through "harvesting", where a
"robot"
program
makes its way around the Internet, grabbing eMail addresses fromWeb pages and Newsgroup
messages. This has spawned two popular methods of tricking the robot list gatherers:
"my_address@myispREMOVE-THIS-LAST-PART.com"
(the robot will not remove the capital
letters in the address but a human would) and "my_address at myisp dot
com"
(the robots do not
recognize this as an eMail address because it does not contain an @ sign. A human would
recognize the use ofphonetics and properly use my_address@myisp.com). In some cases,
spyware and viruses are responsible for stealing an individual's eMail address. Many times, an
individual signs up for a mailing list and the list owner sells the list to another organization. The
purchasing organization often sells the list to another organization. This pattern may continue
endlessly. Occasionally, employees gather eMail addresses through theft. In 2004, AOL charged
a former employee with stealing the company's entire subscriber list, which amounted to 30
million consumers and 90 million screen names (Sullivan "AOL customer"). He then sold list to
a spammer, who sold the list to another spammer.
A few lawsuits have been filed under the guidelines ofCAM-SPAM, although only one
has reached a verdict. A jury found Jaeremy Jaynes guilty of violating CAN-SPAM, and
recommended a 9-year prison term (the judge has not delivered the final sentence). Jaynes was
one of the world's most prolific spammers through the 1990s, sending 10 million eMail
messages per day and generating revenues of $750,000 per month (AP "Trial shows").
Authorities estimated
Jaynes'
net worth at the time ofhis arrest at $24 million dollars.
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Although it is far too early to judge CAN-SPAM, critics believe that the technological
and personnel resources are not available to properly enforce CAN-SPAM. Most also believe
that the act is not well-constructed to properly define and prosecute spam. In addition, most
experts believe that technology, not legislation, is the key to preventing spam eMail messages.
Ultimately, it will take a combination of legislation and technology to prevent spam from
saturating network bandwidth worldwide. However, CAN-SPAM is an attempt by the
government to protect individual pricy by protecting eMail addresses, personal information, and
by preventing phishing attempts from reaching their recipients. Even ifmany experts consider
the act shortsighted and toothless, it is a step in the right direction.
Summary ofGovernment Policies
We should not be surprised that members of the government would strive to undermine
individual privacy, as a recent report disclosed that government officials have been spying on
each other for over a year. According to Charlie Savage, "Republican staffmembers of the US
Senate Judiciary Commitee [SIC] infiltrated opposition computer files for a year, monitoring
secret strategy memos and periodically passing on copies to the media, Senate officials told The
[Boston]
Globe"
("Infiltration of). For at least one year, Republican staffers exploited a
computer glitch that provided them access to protected Democrat documents without the
required passwords, known only to members of the Democratic Party. According to Savage,
". .
.they
were able to read talking points and accounts ofprivate meetings discussing which
judicial nominees Democrats would fight - and with what
tactics"
("Infiltration of). Ifwe
cannot trust members of the government to maintain a sense of legality and ethics in their
dealings with each other, then we definitely cannot trust them in their dealings with individual
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citizens. In this "Information Age", the value of closely guarded information has grown far
beyond the capability of ethics and the legal system to guarantee its protection.
Even the most rational experts are beginning to fear the government's ability to monitor
its citizens. In a commentary for CNET's News.com, security expert Bruce Schneier discussed
the threats looming against residents of the US. According to Schneier,
"In December, a provision slipped into an appropriations bill allowing the FBI to obtain
personal financial information from banks, insurance companies, travel agencies, real
estate agents, stockbrokers, the U.S. Postal Service, jewelry stores, casinos and car
dealerships without a warrant-because they're all construed as financial institutions.
Starting this year, the U.S. government is photographing and fingerprinting foreign




"When you put the police in charge of security, the trade-offs they make result in
measures that resemble a police state. . . The laws limiting police power were put in place
to protect us from police abuse. Privacy protects us from threats by government,
corporations and individuals. And the greatest strength of our nation comes from our
freedoms, our openness, our liberties and our system of
justice"
("Slouching toward").
We must carefully consider the words of experts like Schneier, whose work has defined the core
values of digital security. When the experts begin to question the government's actions, the
residents of this country must take notice. We must be aware of threats from public policy, and
we must use our democratic system to fight back against them.
113
Results ofPolicy Enactment
One only needs to examine the current landscape to witness the effects of legislation on
their lives. A sign erected by the entry area of the Lake George, New York steamboat rides states
the following: "Our SecurityMeasures include taking a photograph ofALL boarding passengers.
While these photos are available for purchase, you are under no obligation to purchase them.
Due to our heightened Security Requirements and for
everyones'
[SIC] safety, all bags and
carry-on items are subject to search". Is it necessary to photograph every passenger boarding a
steamboat on Lake George, or is this a thinly veiled attempt by the steamboat operators to
reposition consumer annoyance at an unnecessary sales pitch on the USG? Whichever the case,
this is one example of a situation where public policy and current events have radically altered
the landscape of our society.
History shows that we must prevent our panoptic information from becoming the
property of the government and law enforcement officials. According to Garfinkel, "In February
1999, the South Carolina Public Safety Department sold photograph's of the state's 3.5 million
drivers to Image Data LLC ofNashua, New Hampshire. The price was a bargain basement of
$5,000, or roughly a penny for seven photos, according to an article in the Washington
Post"
(61). During World War II, the Census Bureau provided the War Department with detailed lists
of the names and addresses Japanese-Americans living in the US (Garfinkel 228). In the 1950's,
the FBI conducted surveillance against Communists and homosexuals throughout the US
(Garfinkel 228). During the 1960s and 1970s, the FBI infiltrated women's groups, black groups,
environmental groups and gay groups on college campuses (Garfinkel 228). Garfinkel nicely
summarizes the controversy surrounding
government invasions:
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"The problem is that the FBI, and the country at large, have shown a willingness to get
caught up in the issues of the day and unfairly target, prosecute, and imprison individuals
for what they say and believe, rather than for what the actually do. This makes it very
difficult to respect the FBI's claims that aggressive new technologies and mandates are
required for tracking and stopping terrorists and
murderers"
(228-229).
The threats discussed in this section are numerous. Each policy and program by itself
presents a disturbing threat to individual privacy, and their combined threat provides an
unprecedented level ofpower to a select few of the highest-ranking individuals in the USG. This
section discussed a few policies designed to protect individual privacy, unfortunately they are
either poorly enforced, or too newly ratified to have shown true effectiveness. For this reason,
the discussed policies and programs raise the Privacy Level Indicator to 4.25. The only thing
preventing the Indicator from reaching the maximum level of 5.0 ("Uncontrolled") are the few
privacy protection laws presented at the end of this section. If those policies receive additional
funding and better enforcement, they could slow the Bush Administration's current trend of
trampling individual privacy. However, it must be reinforced that the policies and programs
discussed in this section provide the USG with the authority to perform an unending panoptic
sort. Our society is on the brink of a crucial moment in history. As we put more time and
distance between September 11, 2001 and the present, the USG must relax its invasive
legislations. It is critical to rethink many of the policies and programs discussed in the following





Data records, a staple of airplanes for decades, are making their way into automobiles.
Automobile manufacturers currently have EDRs (Event Data Recorders) installed in
approximately twenty-five to fortymillion automobiles in the U.S. (Don Oldenburg "The
snoop"). According to David Coursey, "The NHTSA [National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration] estimates that 40 million crash data recorders have been installed in vehicles
sold in the U.S., representing about 20 percent ofvehicles on the road
today"
("Is your"). Most
consumers do not realize that their automobiles contain the devices (used primarily by law
enforcement and automakers for crash investigation and safety improvements). According to
Oldenburg, "A 2002 survey by the Insurance Research Council found that two-thirds of car
buyers didn't have a clue about the data
recorders"
("The snoop"). According to Coursey, "The
automakers kept the existence of these crash data recorders. . .secret until 1999, when a GM
executive revealed their existence (perhaps unintentionally) in a
speech"
("Is your"). The EDRs
found in current automobiles do not record the same volume of information as their airplane
counterparts. Engaged by the same circuitry that engages the airbags, EDRs record mainly crash-
related data.
EDR implementation varies between automobile manufacturers. According to Oldenburg,
"GM, a leader in EDR technology, has been installing the nondescript silver devices in its air-
bag-equipped vehicles since 1974. . .FordMotor Co. has EDRs in all cars, light trucks and SUVs
manufactured in North America since the 2002 model year. OnlyMercedes has taken a public
stance against EDRs, stating that they have an extremely intelligent EDR device waiting for
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implementation in vehicle models, but the company has decided to wait until society and law
enforcement better grasp how to handle the
situation"(Oldenburg"
The snoop").
The recent release of retail EDR devices has intensified the discussion of the devices.
Road Safety International developed one consumer EDR device to allow parents to monitor their
children's driving behavior (Oldenburg "The snoop"). According to Oldenburg,
"The modular components record data, such as seat-belt-use, speed, hard braking, hard
cornering, pedal-to-metal acceleration and throttle positioning, that can be uploaded to
home computers using software that analyzes driving performance. . .But that's only the
beginning: In three months, an under-$200 global positioning system accessory will be
available to record where the car goes. . .Next year, the communications module will
allow parents to locate their teen drivers on an online map in real time".
If
parents'
lack of trust in their children is not reason enough to despise these devices,
then consider some of the other problems. If the EDR device has wireless capabilities (which it
will in order to enable real-time transmission of the car's location to an online map), then it
suffers from the weaknesses and threats facing all wireless
devices.15
Another issue surrounds
the security of the online map that parents can use to track their children. Road Safetymust
assure that the company's employees properly secure the Web Site against crackers or
unauthorized access. In addition, one must question whether anyone will certify the devices, test
them and prove that they only beam information to the specified location. Otherwise, the user
has no idea if the device is beaming information to the government for use as profiling data, or if
Road Safety International is selling information transmitted by the divide to third parties
interested in
users'
travel and driving habits.
15
This thesis discussed wireless devices earlier.
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Cellular Phone Tracking
Currently, it is difficult or impossible to track the location of a cellular phone within a
reasonable proximity. This will change, as cellular phone providers ready E91 1 (Enhanced 911)
systems. The E91 1 initiative forces cellular phone manufacturers and service providers to build
location-aware 911 capabilities into their phones and service networks. Recent situations in
which individuals called 911 from their cellular phones but 91 1 operators could not determine
their location, accelerated E91 1 implementation. E91 1 is a reasonable and necessary feature to
enhance the ability of cellular phones to provide assistance in an emergency. The problem is that
users desire control over when someone is tracking their phone.
The capability and legality of cellular phone tracking varies between countries.
"Finland has proposed a new law that would let parents track the movements of their
young children via mobile phone, even without their consent, in a move that could set an
EU benchmark in privacy and handset use. . .According to the draft, individuals aged 15
or older could only be tracked after giving their consent, but for children under 15 such
consent could also be given by their parents or
guardians"
(MSNBC "Finns ready").
Finland is the most advanced country in the world in cellular phone technology and has the
greatest cellular phone penetration per capita. Ifpassed, this law would also make Finland a
world leader in testing the waters of cellular phone tracking and the privacy issues surrounding
phone tracking. If instituted, this law sets a dangerous precedence in setting privacy rights for
children. However, the issue of children's privacy and safety is a delicate issue, and safety often
takes precedence over privacy. This is most obvious in school districts, which often trample
students'
right to privacy in order to provide them
with a safe and healthy learning environment.
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RFID
RFLD (Radio-Frequency Identification) chips are part of a computing domain known as
"passive computing", in which a device with no computing intelligence can interact with and
provide information to a larger computing system. According to Alorie Gilbert and Richard
Shim, "Radio frequency identification (RFLD) technology uses microchips to wirelessly transmit
product serial numbers to a scanner without the need for human intervention. ("Wal-Mart
cancels"). The first RFLD devices were small rectangular plastic sensors still found in many CDs
and DVDs in retail stores. Newer technology has allowed manufacturers to develop RFID
devices roughly the size of the fingernail on the average human's pinkie finger.
The manufacturing industry is excited at the prospect ofRFID, as the technology will
allow manufacturers to control and automate their processes in ways that were previously
impossible. "Smart
warehouses"
are being designed that will allow the tracking ofRFID-enabled
products from manufacture and assembly to delivery, enabling more efficient operations.
Eventually, automated forklift devices will use RFID tags embedded in products to find a
product on warehouse shelves and deliver it to the shipping department. In addition, RFLD will
allow manufacturers to monitor in real-time their current inventory, enabling them to better
adjust their just-in-time operations.
The problem with RFID devices is that they open the door to monitoring and tracking
consumers through the products they purchase. According to Garfinkel, "Like other
identification systems, RFID system's don't actually identify a car, a pet, or a person: they
simply identify the tag. And since no cryptography is employed by today's RFID systems, an
RFID identification response can be eavesdropped, falsified, or otherwise
forged"
(80). A
product that contains an RFLD chip could allow a retailer to track the consumer's movement
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throughout the store, and possibly beyond the store's limits. According to Garfinkel, "The tags
can also be read without the owner's knowledge. Since today's tags have no memory, there is no
way to determine how many times a tag has been read. . (80). Gillette andWal-Mart had
planned to test a "smart shelf system that would allow the tracking ofRFLD products from the
minute they left the display shelf until the moment they left the store. The trial was to determine
ifRFLD enabled products could prevent shoplifting and assist customer associates in finding
items that customers place back onto the wrong
shelves.16
Reaction to the planned trial from
consumer privacy groups was extremely negative, and Wal-Mart abruptly cancelled the trial
before it began, although Gillette continued with similar plans in stores throughout Europe
(Gilbert and Shim, "Wal-Mart cancels"). C.A.S.P.I.A.N (Consumers Against Supermarket
Privacy Invasion and Numbering), against RFED devices since their introduction in supermarket
"consumer
loyalty"
tags, was especially vocal in calling forWal-Mart to cancel the trial. In
addition, economics may have played a part in the decision, as RFID devices currently cost about
10 cents apiece, which would cut hard at Wal-Mart's slim profit margins in the retail superstore
industry (Gilbert and Shim, "Wal-Mart cancels"). C.A.S.P.I.A.N's boycott threats also caused
Italian clothier Benetton to cancel a trial in which the companywould have sewn RFLD devices
into their clothing (Gilbert and Shim "Wal-Mart cancels").
Unfortunately, Wal-Mart's decision to cancel the "smart shelf trial was only a decoy to
draw attention away from another RFID trial. According to Gilbert, "Wal-Mart Stores and
Procter & Gamble quietly tested a controversial new retail technology earlier this year that
allowed P&G employees to observe shoppers via aWebcam as they removed cosmetics from
shelves, representatives ofboth companies confirmed
Friday"
("Smart Shelf). The test,
conducted in the suburbs ofTulsa, Oklahoma, proves that manufacturers and retailers cannot be
Shoplifters target Gillette's Mach 3 razor blades more than any other product.
120
trusted with RFLD or other forms of tracking technology. Not only did they secretly use RFLD
chips to track product movement, they used aWebcam to spy on innocent shoppers without their
consent. Proctor and Gamble claimed that theWeb cam allowed the company to confirm the
accuracy of the data data generated by the smart shelves (Gilbert "Smart Shelf). If this were
truly the case, then Wal-Mart and Proctor & Gamble should have posted signs near the shelf
specifically detailing the test and the presence of the Webcam, as well as releasing information to
the media beforehand. Proctor & Gamble cited the existence of a sign posted near the shelf
informing customers that electronic monitoring was present, although the sign did not
specifically mention the existence of chips embedded in the product packaging or the Webcam
(Gilbert "Smart Shelf).
Gillette's European RFID trials with retailer Tesco also crossed the line ofprivacy
invasion. According to AndyMcCue, "But privacy groups started protesting outside the Tesco
store when it emerged that the supermarket was automatically taking photographs of shoppers
when they picked the blades off the shelf and when they left the shop with any tagged
product"
("Gillette shrugs"). Once again, a retailer proved that they would not stop with simply tagging
products for inventory management purposes. Instead, they used the RFID as part of a scheme to
spy on consumers while they shopped.
Supporters ofRFLD point to the fact that the devices currently used in inventory and
retail have an effective range of a few inches. The problem with that theory is that it does not
consider other current or future applications. It is critical to halt a dangerous technology in its
infancy, before it has gained maturity and advanced capabilities. It is true that devices used in
stores only have a short range, but RFID devices used for other purposes have much longer
range. In addition, the short range ofRFLD devices is only a valid argument if the cashier
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properly disables the devices during checkout. It is common to see an individual trigger a store's
doorwaymounted RFLD scanners while entering a store for the first time. This happens because
the cashier in the previous store did not properly disable the RFID tags during checkout. In the
future, this could lead to a situation similar to tracking cookies, where one company creates
RFID tags for purchase by retailers. Rather than being disabled at checkout, the devices would
remain active, to track which stores a consumers enters, and in which order. This would provide
valuable marketing data for retailers.
An example of such a device is the EZPass system. EZPass is an RFID device, slightly
smaller than a CD case that the user attaches to the windshield of their automobile. The device
allows the user to drive through EZPass equipped tollbooths without stopping. The system
automatically charges the proper toll amount to the credit card the user supplied when they
signed up for their EZPass account. The first problem with the EZPass system is that the
technology employed allows the reader to contact the windshield-mounted RFLD device from 10
feet away or slightly further. Eventually RFLD devices mounted in product packaging will
achieve that level of sophistication. Then consumers will truly have to worry about retailers and
manufacturers tracking them, or crackers finding unauthorized ways to activate the tags.
Consider a kidnapper using the tags in a child's clothing, the same tags parents purchased to
keep their child safe, to track the child and determine when they are alone.
In addition, the EZPass system proves that RFID-enabled devices set a dangerous
precedent in their ability to collect information. The information recorded by the EZPass system
includes the user's ID number, location of the tollbooth and the time and date that the vehicle
passed through the tollbooth. Law enforcement officials could misuse this information by issuing
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speeding tickets. It could be determined if a traveler was speeding by comparing the time it took
a vehicle to travel between two tollbooths with the distance in miles between the tollbooths.
For-profit organizations are not the only ones interested in RFID, as libraries are
considering the technology to streamline the process ofborrower checkout. According to Joe
Garofoli, "The San Francisco Public Library is ready to spend $1 million on technology that
would make it easier to check out and track its collection and reduce costly workplace-related
injuries. . .The tracking devices are called radio-frequency identification computer chips, RFLD
for
short."
(A-20). RFLD tags will benefit librarians, but at a cost to
consumers'
privacy.
Consider a scenario where someone has just recently discovered that they have a fatal illness,
such as AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). They have not yet disclosed this to
anyone, and are reading books and magazines on the disease and its treatments. Someone
examining the individual's library records could determine that they have the disease, and even
come close to pinpointing the time when the individual learned they had the illness. Or,
situations could occur where a strange coincidence might cause police to be suspicious of an
innocent individual. In addition, it is important to understand that RFID tags are a new
technology, and eventually someone will discover a way to gain access to RFID chips outside of
their intended scanner. In the future, what will stop FBI agents from sitting in unmarked vehicles
across the parking lot or street from libraries, examining the books an individual just checked
out? Just imagine if the technology was this advanced when the September 11, 2001 tragedies
occurred: Agents could discreetly examine the books borrowed by every person ofMiddle
Eastern descent at every library in the country, without alerting the individual or the librarian.
This would enable a completely new level of racial profiling. If it does not seem possible,
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consider that the technology advances daily: The RFLD devices being considered by the San
Francisco Public Library can be read from up to 3 feet away (Garofoli A-20).
Another danger from RFLD is wearable ID badges required in many organizations,
especially educational institutions. Teachers commonly have to wear LD badges with their name
and photo in plain sight. The dangerous aspect of these badges is their potential for misuse. LD
badges are often bar coded with information about the individual depicted on the badge, for use
in the school's library or cafeteria. The problem is that districts could implement systems that
would allow remote scanning of the bar codes. A district would only need to specify that an
individual wear their badge on the outside of their body in plain site. The district could then
place sensors around its schools, or in front of certain key areas (exits, bathrooms, lounges,
computer labs or any other area of concern) to track the movement of individuals throughout the
building. The information could automatically be stored in a data warehouse and mined by
automated mining programs or manually by humans. This would allow the district to determine
the habits and patterns of individual teachers. This information could determine if a teacher takes
"too
many"
trips to or spends "too
much"
time in the bathroom, lounge, computer labs or
outside. The district and administration in question determine what defines "too
many"
and "too
much", which is a potential for information abuse beyond the fact that the school would be
tracking its teachers. One only needs to consider that students could also be required to wear
similar badges, which increase the threat posed by ID tags.
As more devices become RFID enabled, the threat from government intrusion increases.
If the government can gain access to the data collected by an individual's RFLD devices and
credit cards, they can track that individual with startling accuracy. According to Guy Kewney,
"Amalgamate the data from the bank with the data from Exxon with the data from a transit
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system. Then add a loyalty card system, a mobile phone payment network, and a Government LD
card system. The result: the State can track every citizen with far, far more detail than a simple
RFLD tracker could ever manage".
Security and privacy companies have begun working on products that will help alleviate
consumers'
privacy tag fears while allowing organizations to implement RFLD-based solutions.
RSA, known for its expertise in encryption technology, created an RFLD "Blocker
Tag"
that
prevents RFLD devices from being properly read. The blocker tag sends signals to the RFID
reader that prevents it from reading nearby tags (Fisher "RSA Keeps"). RSA is working with
retailers to develop bags equipped with the blocker tags (Fisher "RSA Keeps"). After checkout,
the sales associate would place the consumer's merchandise in a bag equipped with a blocker
tag, reassuring the customer that the retailer is no longer querying the tagged merchandise.
Solutions such as RSA's blocker tag are critical to the success ofRFLD at the retail level. Only
by reassuring consumers that their privacy is being protected can RFLD make its way into store
shelves. The blocker tag does not protect the consumer once they return home and dispose of the
bag, but that will not be a problem until RFLD devices greatly overcome their distance
limitations.
To answer these concerns, researchers atMIT (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology)
started the Auto-ID Center (http://www.autoidlabs.org/) to develop technologies and procedures





whichwould permanently disable the RFID device upon a product's scanning at the
checkout register. In addition, they are developing a code of conduct for manufacturers and
retailers to follow in implementing RFLD. As with other similar technologies, the key is to
provide proactive and open information to the public. Wal-Mart's secret RFLD trials were a
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major setback for RFID, Proctor & Gamble and Wal-Mart. Retailers should inform consumers
when they enter the premises that RFLD enabled devices are present in the store, so that each
consumer may decide if they still desire to enter the store.
State legislatures are also considering the future ofRFLD. According to Jane Black,
"On Feb. 24, the Utah House ofRepresentatives passed a bill mandating clear labeling of
any product in which an RFLD chip is embedded. A bill introduced on Feb. 27 in the
California Senate goes further, arguing that retailers should need
consumers'
permission. . .The new [California] bill requires any business or state agency that uses an
RFLD system to track products and people to follow three rules. First, tell people that
RFLD is tracking and collecting information about them. Second, get express consent







Many stores now require their customers to use
"loyalty"
cards at checkout to receive
advertised discounts. The cards, small enough to fit easily on a keychain, contain a barcode that
the cashier scans upon checkout. The barcode is linked to the customer's account when they
enrolled in the program. Scanning the card at checkout enables the store to track each customer's
purchases. Retailers claim that the cards benefit consumers, because it enables stores to offer
individual coupons to customers based on their previous shopping history. Some stores print out
coupons with the receipt for items that the customer just purchased, or has purchased in the past.
The issue with loyalty cards revolves around information tracking and security. Most
supermarkets and pharmacies require their customers to use the cards if they want to receive
advertised discounts. This enables retailers to create a database containing all of their customers
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and their purchases. Any time a database exists, there is potential for misuse, resale, government
intrusion or data theft. C.A.S.P.I.A.N, has fought diligently against the cards, and tracks every
instance of theirmisuse. In one case, law enforcement officials accused a firefighter of arson
while investigating the fire that destroyed his home when they found a charred
"firestarter"
from
Safeway (C.A.S.P.I.A.N. "News"). They used the purchasing information maintained by
Safeway'
s loyalty card program to determine that he had recently purchased the item at the store
(C.A.S.P.I.A.N. "News"). Authorities later dropped all charges against the firefighter when his
wife confessed to the crime (C.A.S.P. I.A.N. "News").
The data warehouses resulting from loyalty cards also threaten privacy and can result in
identity theft, if they are not secured properly. Katherine Albrecht, director ofC.A.S.P. I.A.N.,
discovered a flaw in the design of
CVS'
Web Site that enabled the retrieval of
customers'
shopping information by entering the card number, their zip code and the first three letters of
their last name (MSNBC "CVS pulls"). Although she was not able to obtain prescription records,
Albrecht was able to obtain a record of all other purchases, including condoms and birth control
(MSNBC "CVS pulls"). Albrecht has long been an opponent of the card programs, often citing
their threat to privacy, as well as their influence on price increases (Albrecht "Supermarket
Cards").
The threat from loyalty cards increases daily, as more companies adopt loyalty card
programs, and endlessly grow their data warehouses. The threat of intrusion, from the
government or crackers, makes these programs dangerous. Retailers must be convinced to cease
loyalty card programs before we experience a compromise of a large retailer's data warehouse.
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Chip Implants: Voluntary. . .For Now
Applied Digital Solutions, the company that gained attention two years ago with its
wearable chip named the "Digital Angel", has developed a new implantable chip named the
"VeriChip", which the company is currently testing inMexico. The company chose Mexico as a
test site for the new chip because a high level ofkidnappings and robberies victimizes the
country.
Current implementations utilize the chip as a means of creating a centralized database
containing all of the user's medical information. Every chip contains a unique serial number that
doctors and hospitals can use (if they have the necessary scanning equipment) to discover
medical information regarding the individual. This system is especially useful in emergency
rooms or ambulances, where patients are often unable to answer for themselves, and doctors
often are unaware of the patient's medical history. The FDA (Food and Drug Administration)
maintains that they will not regulate the implants, as long as the medical information is not
contained directly on the chip.
Currently, Applied Digital Solutions does not have the ability to track the location of the
VeriChip in real-time, but the company has been working since the chip's introduction to
develop the necessary technology. The more advanced Digital Angel chip is traceable, but it is
larger and worn externally in a wristwatch, rather than being implanted under the skin. The
Digital Angel chip can monitor conditions such as heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature
and provide tracking information. If the device notices a potential problem in the wearer, it can
contact emergency medical personnel to inform them of the situation and the wearer's location.
In theory, the Digital Angel chip would inform medical personnel that the wearer is about to
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suffer a problem (such as a heart attack) before it actually happens. The company plans to
implement those features in the VeriChip in the near future.
The problems with these chips are obvious. With tracking capabilities, the chip provides
the ability to track the location of the wearer in real-time. Applied Digital Solutions claims that
the chip's tracking ability is disabled, and only activated manually by the wearer, or when the
chip detects an emergency. The Digital Angel, the only chip that currently provides tracking
ability, is worn externally, and thus could be removed by the user if they fear being tracked. This
is not possible with the skin-implanted VeriChip. Once the VeriChip achieves tracking
capabilities, the wearer will have to trust that Applied Digital Solutions is not spying on them,
and that the company is not providing the government with tracking equipment. Since the chips
are wireless, they fall prey to all of the vulnerabilities that currently effect wireless devices, and
are susceptible to interception by a third party.
In addition, the technology raises the question as to whether any government would ever
make the
"chipping"
of its citizens mandatory. Thus far, the USG appears to prefer invasions that
are external (SSNs and
drivers'
licenses), and we can only hope that they do not choose a more
invasive measure of identification and monitoring.
There are obvious benefits to the chips, such as placing them in your children's clothing
to make tracking easier in the case of a kidnapping incident, or placing them in
pets'
collars or
under their skin to track a lost pet. One recent story extols the benefits of chips for pets: A cat
with an LD microchip implanted under his skin was returned to his owner 10 years after he
jumped out a window and vanished (MSNBC "Chip helps"). Modern chips that allow tracking
would have enabled the family to find the pet almost immediately. Perhaps a tracking chip would
have enabled authorities to find Elizabeth Smart. Balancing the safety benefits of implanted
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chips with their privacy risk requires openness and information disclosure. Parents should choose
external chips placed in an item such as clothing, and parents must have control over the chip's
activation, operation and deactivation. In addition, parents must have handheld tracking devices
that would allow them to determine their child's location instantly. When a kidnapping occurs,
the parent must be able to alert authorities quickly, before the kidnapper can change the child's
clothing. The externally worn chip is much less invasive than the implanted version, although
each has considerable privacy risks.
Late in 2003, Applied Digital Solutions introduced a new version of their implanted chip,
with improved software operating on Applied Digital Solution's servers. The new chip and
supporting software would allow the wearer to connect their bank accounts and credit cards to
the chip's LD number. This would enabled a chipped individual to complete a purchase at a chip-
enabled POS (Point-of-Sale) device or withdraw money from a chip-enabled ATM machine by
simply standing close to a chip reader attached to the POS device or ATM machine. One of the
problems with this chip is that it transmits its signal by broadcast, creating the possibility that a
criminal could construct a device that would capture the broadcast signal out of the air, decode it
and use it in an identity theft scheme (DeclanMcCullagh "An ATM").
Social Engineering: Getting the Information From its Source
Miller describes social engineering as, "The attacker uses human nature to fool the victim
into allowing improper access or revealing private
information"
(226). In many cases, the best
way to gather personal information is to query the
source. By nature, human beings are careless
and easy to deceive, making them perfect targets to divulge their own personal information.
Site spoofing has become a very common means of tricking individuals into providing
their personal information. The thief creates a page that looks exactly like a knownWeb page.
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Creating an exact copy of a given Web page orWeb site is very easy, using the "Save
As"
feature inMicrosoft IE6. This feature allows the user to save an exact copy of the Web page
currently loaded into the browser, including all of the images displayed on the page. Next, the
thief registers a domain very similar to that of the page they are copying (often using common
typographical errors that might occur in the address, such as adding an
's'
to the end ofHotmail,
or typing an
'n'
instead of an 'm'). Another variation of this attack uses the @ sign in a URL to
redirect the page to another location. For example, http://hotmail.com@mydomain.com would
load the page located at mydomain.com, not hotmail.com. Then, the attacker uses a form on the
copied page to capture data entered by unwitting users. Site spoofing is successful because the
page looks exactly like the one users thought they were visiting, and most users do not pay close
attention to the address of the site in the browser. According to Alorie Gilbert,
"This rapidly proliferating form ofonline fraud called phishing involves imposter
e-
mails and Web sites that look like they are from legitimate companies such as eBay.
When people enter their passwords, credit-card numbers and other personal information,
a thief on the other end collects the information to make charges on customer credit
cards"
("Tech Firms").
Phishing has become such as prolific activity that eBay, Citibank and PayPal, the most
common organizations spoofed in phishing attempts, have launched extensive campaigns to
inform customers regarding eMail schemes. These companies provide information on theirWeb
sites regarding information that they legitimately collect via eMail, and methods to prevent
becoming a victim ofphishing. Companies have banded together and formed the APWG
(Anti-
Phishing Working Group) to develop cross-industry methods of combating phishing attempts.
Despite attempts to inform customers, the number ofphishing messages is increasing rapidly, as
131
is the number of customers that suffer identity theft resulting from responding to an illegitimate
message. According to Jennifer Barrett, "GIANT, an anti-spam software company, has seen
more than double the number ofphishing e-mails so far this month [January 2004] than in all of
2003. . .Citibank has already identified five fraudulent e-mails sent out to
customers"
('"Phishing
For'"). Although a few phishing attempts come from teenage hackers, the majority of them come
from organized crime syndicated located in Europe and Asia (Barrett '"Phishing For'").
Experts have suggested a handful of technological advances to prevent spam and
phishing attempts from reaching their intended recipient, although it will be at least late-2004,
and realistically 2005 or 2006, before their implementation. Two of the most promising
proposals have been submitted byMicrosoft and Yahoo!, and each company has been trying to
garner support for their respective solutions. The solutions are different, but each would require
better domain authentication on the sender's eMail address before sending a message. The
Anti-
Spam Community Registry submitted a proposal to ICANN for a .mail gTLD (generic Top Level
Domain) that would attempt to separate legitimate senders from illegitimate ones. Registering for
a .mail address requires an organization to provide an extensive amount of documentation
verifying its identity and purpose, along with a hefty registration fee. While this would not stop
spammers from using other gTLDs for spam and phishing attempts, it would provide a
"safe"
gTLD for legitimate companies.
Overhearing a conversation is the best low-tech method of gathering information. For
example, "Toys 'R
Us"
requests the customer's phone number during checkout. The sales
associate, customers waiting in the same checkout line and customers in nearby checkout lines
can overhear the customer's telephone number. The members of the
"R"
Us family (Toys 'R Us,
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Babies 'R Us) seem to be particularly adept at gathering personal information. The following
excerpt is from their privacy policy:
"The
"R"
Us Familymembers collect personally identifiable information that you
provide when you make a purchase; visit the Retail Stores, the Online Stores, or the
"R"
Us Sites; create or edit your Registries and Wish Lists; participate in a contest or
sweepstakes promotion; fill out a survey or questionnaire; sign up for a survey; contact an
"R"
Us Familymember (by e-mail or otherwise); contact
"R"
Us Family customer service
representatives; or otherwise interact with an
"R"
Us Familymember. Information that
you provide at the Retail Stores may be combined with information that you provide
online at the
"R"
Us Sites and Online Stores as well as with information about your
product interests and purchases. The information you provide to
"R"
Us Familymembers
may also be combined with demographic and other information that is publicly available
in order to allow the
"R"




The privacy policy does not mention the company's practice of requesting
customers'
telephone
number at checkout. Some
"R"
Us stores have posted a sign at the checkout counter stating that
providing your telephone number is optional. Unfortunately, the stores posted signs after the
company began requesting customer's telephone numbers, allowing them gather numbers for an
extended period without properly informing the customer of their rights. Interestingly, the signs
direct the customer to the privacy policy to find information regarding this practice, yet the
privacy policy does not mention
telephone numbers specifically, only personal information in




telephone number, and the




Us company's use of customer information. The following selection, taken from the
same privacy policy, states the
"R"
Us policy on information usage (the author added the italics
to emphasize two particular sentences):
"Using Your Personal Information Your personal information is used by the
"R"
Us
Familymembers to enhance your guest relationship with them, respond to your requests,
tailor offerings to you, communicate with you aboutproducts, services, special offerings,
and events orprograms offered by the
"R"
Us Family members or their marketing
partners that may be of interest to you. The
"R"
Us Family may also use this information
to analyze and manage its businesses. Aggregate data (which does not allow an individual
to be identified, contacted, or located) is collected from online and offline facilities and
may be used to enhance the ability of the
"R"
Us Family members to communicate with
you and for internal analysis and management
purposes."
'From time to time you may receive periodic mailings, telephone calls, or e-mails from
"R"
Us Family members with information on newproducts or services, discounts, special
promotions, upcoming events, or other offersfrom an
"R"




The company's privacy policy plainly states that an
"R"
Us familymember or marketing partner
may contact customers regarding
product offerings. Two problems regarding this statement stand
out: The first is "Who are these marketing
partners?"
and the second is "How do these
companies know for sure which offers a consumer would like informed
about?"
The following
selection, taken from the same privacy policy, states the
"R"
Us policy on information sale
(italics added for emphasis):
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"Sharing Your Personal Information
"R"
Us Familymembers will not license, sell, or
provide your personal information to any unaffiliated third party except as permitted by
this policy or with your consent. The
"R"




Us Family Members. Personal information collected by one member ofthe
"R"
Us Family will be used by that member in accordance with this policy andmay be
shared with other
"R"
Us Family membersfor use only in accordance with this Privacy
Policy...
In Connection with Business Transfers. In the event that a store, division, orpart or all
ofan
"R"
Us Family member (or the assets ofone ofthose entities) is bought or sold,
customer information will likely be included among the transferred business
assets"
(ToysRUs.com "The 'R'").
The corporation states that it will not sell information to any unaffiliated third party,
except as permitted by the policy or through consent. One must wonder who defines an affiliated
third party, and what steps are necessary to become an affiliated third party. In addition, the
policy plainly states that if the
"R"
Us company sells assets that include personal information,
the company will sell the customer information as part of the agreement. If the company that
purchases the assets (including the customer information) has no regard for customer privacy,
then expect that company to sell the customer information as often as possible.
As another example of social engineering, individuals usually do not consider the risks of
cellular phone usage, and often provide information to everyone standing in a relatively close
proximity. The problem worsens when the conversation occurs over a poor connection, as the
cellular phone user often shouts into the phone in an attempt to make themselves clear to the
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other party. The increasing ubiquity of cellular phones means that more people are using cellular
phones that do not have the common sense or knowledge to use them correctly and privately.
People, especially business people, need proper training and instruction on the various uses (and
misuses) of cell phones (John C. Dvorak "Dangerous Phone"). After overhearing a phone
conversation on an airplane, Dvorak wrote the following in a column: "The guy goes on and on.
I find out his name. I find out his position. I find out he's flying to Boston in a few days. I know
his schedule. I know who he works for. I'm hearing other names and extension numbers. Wow.
I'm finding out far too much
information"
("Dangerous Phone").
Methods ofmass transportation, such as airlines, subways and busses, pose the largest
threat when considering the problems ofportable devices. As wireless capabilities become
commonplace on airplanes, airlines are reminding passengers of the dangers posed by laptops
and PDAs (Tony Hallett "Airline security"). According to Hallett, "While snooping over
someone's shoulder in a plane won't allow files to be copied in the same way as an electronic
breach, there are security issues. These are compounded as with loud public mobile phone
conversations when users of a laptop or PDA in a train, bus or other public place forget they
are 'out in the
open'"
("Airline security").
Office and network design practices at the organizational and personal levels can also
reveal plenty ofprivate information. Many individuals have their computer monitors placed in
such a way that a casual observer can
read everything that is on the screen. Protective shields
would prevent this, as would simply turning the monitor a different direction. Employees often
leave private materials scattered around their desk or work area. Leaving the room for a moment
opens up the information to
the prying eyes of everyone else in the room. Many organizations
label every computer and
peripheral with its network name, location and LP address. While this is
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an acceptable strategy from an administrative point ofview, it would have been better to place
the labels somewhere on the devices where they were not visible to every customer in the store.
Providing customers with that information only makes it that much easier for them to hack into
the local network, or for other employees to steal computing resources.
Occasionally, information release can cause great personal embarrassment, as in the case
of the 19-year-old woman that accused Kobe Bryant of rape. According to an AP report, "The
name ofKobe Bryant's accuser was mistakenly posted on a state court Web site Tuesday as part
of a legal filing in the case. A subpoena showing the 19-year-old woman's name and address was
up for about an hour before court staffers reposted it with her personal information blacked
out"
(MSNBC "State mistakenly"). Unfortunately, this was not the first disclosure of the woman's
name, although it was the first time it was revealed by sources directly involved in the case.
Bryant supporters had previously posted the woman's name onWeb Sites and a radio talk show
host had previously disclosed the woman's name on air.
This occurrence requires special attention, because while the accidental disclosure on the
state court's Web Site was accurate, the information (including photographs) posted on many
other Web Sites was not. All of the Web Sites that contained incorrect information contained the
same information about another female, somehow mistakenly identified as the accuser. The
spread of the information was so prevalent, and the amount of retribution the wrongly identified
female suffered so great, she took her story ofmistaken identity to the newspapers and airwaves
in an attempt to clear her name. This is a perfect example of the dangers associate with false
positives, and why it is critical that information be properly gathered, maintained, stored and
verified. Inaccurate information and false positives can ruin and endanger innocent lives.
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The Lurking Dangers of Identity Theft
The Information Age has made identity theft a much more serious problem then ever
before. According to Lemos, "The research firm [Gartner] estimates that 3.4 percent ofU.S.
consumers
-
about 7 million adults - have been victims of identity theft of some form in the past
year"
("Analyst: Crime"). According to Sullivan,
"Nearly 10 million consumers have been victimized by some form of identity theft in the
past year [2002], the Federal Trade Commission said Wednesday. . .Victims lost $5
billion because of the crime last year, FTC officials said, and businesses have lost close
to $50 billion dealing with the problem. . .the FTC concluded that 27 million adults had
been victimized by some form of LD theft in the past five
years"
("FTC: Millions").
And now it appears that identity theft is becoming a tool of criminal syndicates. According to
Sullivan,
"Miguel Hernandez and his extended family moved into a dream, half-million-dollar
hideaway home along the banks of the Columbia River in Vancouver, Wash., on April
1 . . .the small palace was just one of 23 homes the family is said to have purchased in the
past two years, scooping up $4 million worth ofproperties. . .all of them purchased by
identity theft, according to local police ("Alleged ID").
Organized identity theft rings may start with individual families that plan elaborate crimes, but it
is only a matter of time before organized crime begins using identity theft to carry out complex
operations globally.
Credit card theft is the main threat of identity theft. Once someone has access to an
individual's credit card or credit card number, they have access to their credit line, and possibly
138
other personal information. According to Lemos, "Gartner found that 5.5 percent of the U.S.
adults surveyed, or 11 million nationally, were victims of credit card
fraud"
("Analyst: Crime").
A startling and disturbing trend in identity theft cases is the rate at which identity theft is
striking children. An estimated 500,000 children have their identity stolen each year (Janet
Shamlian "Main culprits"). Hundreds of thousands of children are having their identity stolen
each year, as loved ones, often parents or grandparents, use children's spotless credit histories for
their own gains. Countless stories have surfaced already of children grown into young adulthood,
only to be denied credit or employment due to a credit history that was ruined by family
members. In one case, a 10-year old girl had 17 credit cards carrying thousands of dollars in
balances, and had been approved for a $42,000 home loan (Shamlian "Main culprits"). All of the
accounts belonged to her mother, who had opened them in her daughter's name and SSN.
The USG has unleashed a strong offensive against identity theft. A series of commercials
hit the airwaves in 2003, and all 38,000 Post Offices around the country erected matching posters
(Sullivan "Beware LD"). In addition, the government sent 3,000,000 information booklets to
consumers across the country (Sullivan "Beware ID"). Late in 2003, Congress began considering
controversial legislation to prevent identity theft. The problem with the national legislation is that
it takes precedence over state legislation, which is often much stricter and provides better
assurances to victims of identity theft (Sullivan "Congress mulls"). Consumer groups are against
federal legislation, because it will allow credit card companies and credit bureaus to continue
with their lax practices in dealing with identity theft, one of the reasons why the crime is
reaching epidemic proportions (Sullivan "Congress mulls"). Unrelenting in their pursuit for
privacy protection, the consumer groups
intensified their efforts. According to Sullivan, "In
October, The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, a California group, made its point
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by using an airplane skywriter to write the first five digits ofCitigroup CEO Charles Prince's
social security number above Citigroup headquarters in New
York"
("Congress mulls"). This
same advocacy group posted the SSNs ofAttorney General John Ashcroft and other government
officials on aWeb site to protest the USA PATRIOT ACT. The group's actions prove the point
that information is too readily available and the government must take immediate action to
prevent identity theft. Federal legislation is necessary, but it must be strict and protective of
consumers.
Section Summary
This section provided a look at many emerging technology that are potential threats to
individual privacy. However, since they are still emerging, the level of their threat has not
reached its full potential. Given their potential for future threat, these emerging technologies
raise the Privacy Threat Indicator to 4.50. If this analysis were taking place two years in the
future, the discussed technologies might produce a greater change in the Privacy Level Indicator.




This thesis sought to answer the following hypothesis: Changes in publicpolicy and
technological advances have greatly reduced the level of individualprivacy in modern society.
Its goal was to define and measure the "privacy level", a quantifiable element describing the
availability ofprivacy in relation to changes
in current events, technology and public policy. The
privacy level indicates the amount of
control that individuals have over their own panoptic
information, leading to
"control"
as the natural definition for the term privacy. Measuring
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changes to the privacy level required the development of a new tool, the Privacy Level Indicator.
The Privacy Level Indicatormeasured changes in society, technology and public policy, to
determine the current privacy level, and by definition, the availability ofprivacy in modern
society.
It was determined that the current privacy level is 4.50
- Threatened, implying that
individuals concerned with keeping their panoptic information private must be vigilant in their
efforts to maintain privacy, but also offering some control, while providing hope for the greater
availability ofprivacy in the future. To cause a large increase in the Privacy Level Indicator, a
threat required proofof current exploitation. A threat with a high potential for privacy invasion
without proofof current usage caused a smaller change to the Indicator. In the future, any one of
the factors examined in this thesis could increase their threat to individual privacy, pushing the
Indicator closer to its highest level. Conversely, any of the examined factors could lower their
threat to individual privacy, causing a decrease in the Indicator. The following chart details each
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The measurements determined that the hypothesis was true, exposing a direct link between
141
changes in society, technology and public policy and changes in the privacy level. These changes
have greatly reduced the availability ofprivacy in modern society.
We are dealing with a new existence, in which technology improves at an unimaginable
rate, and a few terrorists can change the face of the world. Public policymust change at a rate
matching changes in technology and society to assure proper privacy protection. In 1890, Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis described a world in which technology and public policy were
producing a detrimental invasion ofprivacy ("The Right"). Warren and Brandeis saw the need
for legal protection in that era, stating,
"That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as
old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew
the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition ofnew rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to
meet the new demands of
society"
("The Right").
Even though the founding documents of our country do not provide any basis for a "right to
privacy", experts have proven beyond a doubt through the years that such a right should exist to
maintain an individual's well being. It may be 1 14 years since 1890, but we are still struggling
with the same issues today as dominated the headlines so many years ago. All individuals must
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